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Introduction: Convergence or Divergence? 
 
      This chapter explores institutional complementarities across business administration 
and industrial relations in Germany. German business administration was defined by the 
significance of banking corporations, concentrated shareholders, subsidies, and a 
coordinated structure. This configuration demonstrated significant linkages with mutually 
reinforcing relationships, funding for higher education, diversified quality production, 
long term contracts, as well as collaborative workplace relationships in the post war 
years. Since the late nineties, business administration has been transformed, a weakening 
of banking corporations, the relaxation of managerial constraints, a strengthening of 
organizational entrepreneurship and investment from abroad, the emergence of new 
financial markets, and a change in the payments of shareholders (Gospel and Pendleton, 
2004). The chapter enquires into the transformation of corporate governance and its 
strong influence on the German industrial relations network. This change may well be 
associated with a decrease in long term employment as well as the increase of variable 
remuneration. Nevertheless, these trends in corporate governance have not undermined 
codetermination, or negotiations between managers and employees. Labour institutions 
still have an important role in the management of large companies. The consequences for 
the German model of industrial relations are analyzed.               
      The issue discussed in this case is important well beyond the boundaries of the 
unified Germany. In the post-industrial times of free markets, economies around the 
world are faced with intense difficulties concerning political and social structures. How 
much centralization or decentralization? What sort of regulation or deregulation? Is there 
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a future for trade unions? What are the possible economic alternatives based on social 
partnership between employers and employees, to conventional Anglo-Saxon 
liberalization? 
      The workplace relations in modern Germany are a significant illustration for all these 
matters. German politics are at the heart of the EU and exercise a great influence upon 
economic advances in both western and eastern Europe, as a consequence Germany is a 
distinctive model of industrial democracy of a large nation. 
Postwar West Germany was famous for its social market economy, a market economy 
accompanied by extensive social programmes and regulated through negotiations among 
powerful actors, including government, business, and labour. (Turner, 1998) 
At the centre of the German industrial democracy is social partnership which is a major 
issue in this case-study.  
Social partnership can be defined as a method of market regulation in which strongly organized 
business and labour negotiate comprehensive agreements that frame the political economy from 
top to bottom. (ibid. 1998) 
In the German IR, it takes the shape of top settlements, inclusive sector-level collective 
bargaining, company-level and shop floor decision making, and other significant deals 
which form vocational training and labour strategy. On the whole, they are the foundation 
stones of industrial democracy and social partnership in the new Germany. 
      Accordingly, the debate introduced here is primarily one about institutions, distinct in 
many ways from interpretations founded on individual or political choice, economic 
efficiency, and social or political constructivism. Industrial relations are discussed 
inadequately, exactly because they fail to include the major influence of institutions in 
forming beliefs, values, cultures, preferences, manners and other associations of authority 
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(Wildavsky, 1994). Even though collective understanding adds significantly to a study of 
the origins of influential institutions, the institutions themselves, as soon as they are 
founded, incorporate beliefs, the results of former disputes, and form up-to-date values 
and cultures. 
      The institutional approach is especially convincing in times of economic stability 
(Steinmo and Thelen, 1992). An uncertain state of affairs, like the unification of West 
and East Germany, suggests a more difficult background in which to examine the 
institutional approach. 
      Therefore, institutional expansion comprises an important element of this 
investigation. 
In the years following unification, in a highly volatile and in some ways wide-open economic 
landscape, actors in the East made decisions that were conditioned by the newly transferred 
institutions, often at the expense of economic efficiency, personal preference, rational choice, 
apparent considerations of interest, or eastern political tradition and collective understandings. 
(Turner, 1998) 
Consequently, arbitration and results of dispute in political, economic, and social spheres 
were  determined  to  a  degree  by  institutional  transfer,  as  the  new   institutions   
formed  professional values, preferences, and authority associations.  
      In spite of well built conventions, high levels of unemployment, and a recession, it 
can be advocated that the only way the astonishing developments in East Germany may 
be comprehended is to identify how institutional expansion from West Germany has 
formed attitudes and preferences for employers and business executives, the employees 
and their delegates, and public servants. 
In the context of dynamic market change unleashed by the single European market as well as 
broader international competition and globalization of markets, existing German institutions of 
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industrial relations may well place the survival of social partnership in Germany within the range 
of possible outcomes. (ibid. 1998) 
The institutions provide this alternative by making available for works councillors and 
managers a secure position from which to support their nationwide interests in addition to 
a groundwork on which to extend international cooperation. The significance of 
institutions for academic research, works councillors, chief executives, and state politics, 
will have to be taken into account. The issue to stress at this point is that unions and 
social partnership are not obsolete in a global economy. 
      The resilience of the German system indicates that the coordinated market economy 
which some scholars regard highly will carry on being an integral part of a global 
economy in the future (Soskice, 1990). The social partnership, a major part of this 
system, especially the trade union and works council alternative, can provide a choice 
against the more liberal market economies, an option that may be compared between 
countries in Europe. Extensive decorporatization of Swedish society had already began 
during the eighties (Rothstein, 2002). The persistence of the German variant as opposed 
to the liberalization of the Swedish system, apart from its generous welfare state, 
indicates that a decentralized variant of corporatism is more consistent than a centralized 
system with market globalization (Thelen, 1993; Turner, 1998). A more detailed analysis 
of the Swedish economy is beyond the scope of this study but the decentralization of the 
German model will be broadly discussed. 
      Most organizations and institutions are both flexible and inflexible. Supranational 
organizations like the European works councils suggest that significant new institutions 
may be established. The evolution of employment relations in East Germany since the 
late eighties suggests that old organizations can disintegrate and effective new ones may 
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be founded, when they are properly adjusted to enduring structures. Institutional transfer 
can prevent the maintenance of the existing state of affairs and culminate in institutional 
revitalization or institutional disintegration. 
 
Employment Relations in the New Land 
       
      This section describes the key features of the old communist industrial relations in 
eastern Germany by drawing attention to shop floor unofficial decision-making and the 
feelings that the employees had for the employers, their labour, and trade unions. Giving 
an account of the late institutional structure serves as a depiction of the advance of the 
convergence of employment relations. 
      It was stated in the introduction that the institutional expansion has been 
accomplished and is beyond dispute, however, this can not also be stated for the sense of 
institutional values. It must be noted too that the concept of transformation is employed 
for central and eastern Europe for a continuing procedure (Eisen, 1996; Frege 1999). This 
section identifies the fundamental and underlying principles of post-communist 
convergence in East Germany. 
      An important idealistic principle of the employment relations structure was probably 
that it formed a distinct, uniform, all-societal interest network which included all classes 
(Hethy, 1994). It is argued that the all-societal interest stemmed from the exertion of 
authority by the working people and from the state ownership of the economic resources. 
The workplace relations actors could be classified as neither self governing nor 
sovereign, and were also considered to be unanimously in favour of the socialist structure 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
7 
(Csuhaj and Hethy, 1990). The employment relations network indicated a holistic 
approach of the benefits of society, and challenged the presence of divergent or 
contradictory political and economic interests among employment relations actors, and 
theoretically there was no exploitation of the workers. When discrepancies or conflicting 
interests emerged, they were taken as examples of personal misconduct, or as 
infringement of the rules and regulations, and were regarded as subversion opposed to the 
social morality (Hethy, 1991). Besides, collective bargaining and differences of opinion 
were not thought as very important. In a greatly centralized interest representation 
procedure the East German government determined the one best way for collective 
activities and workplace relations in a strongly centralized bureaucratic structure and 
carefully administered the accomplishment of goals set by an equally inflexible 
bureaucratic management (ibid. 1991). 
      The idea of uniform social values was illustrated in the institutional standards of the 
trade unions. 
First, the production principle made all those employed in one sector eligible for union 
membership, second, the widespread socialist organizational form of democratic centralism was 
also applied to the union organization. (Frege, 1999) 
Administration was highly centralized as well as increasingly dependent on external 
influence by the government and the directors. 
The union remained closely subordinate to the Party, in addition, the close collaboration between 
management and Party officials within the enterprise severely restricted independent union 
activity. (ibid. 1999) 
Therefore, it becomes evident that trade unions were also bureaucratic organizations of 
interest representation. 
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      Some writers propose that control mechanisms, the personnel policies and the 
centralized organization exercised no great influence upon the course of action on the 
shop floor (Fritze, 1993). Other authors suggest that a framework of centralised, scientific 
and rational operations from one point of view, and resilient institutional procedures from 
another point of view, defined the communist system (Heering and Schroeder, 1992). 
      Regardless of the discrepancies between the scholars, evidence in other studies 
indicates that in the former socialist GDR and all over central and eastern Europe, 
informal bargaining was present on the shop floor (Frege, 1996). For that reason, 
unofficial bargaining may be taken as something significant and as the rise to power for 
the workers and their delegates. 
      The academic literature talks about emergency communities, and a plan fulfillment 
pact for both employers and employees (Heidenreich, 1992). This was advantageous to 
the two camps, but as concerns the society and the economy at large the procedure was 
not quite as useful. The unofficial agreements encouraged the detachment of employees 
from productivity, though the companies attained versatility and obedience on the part of 
the employees. The politicization of the industrial relations is frequently utilized by 
researchers to account for the organic rigidity of the companies, for example the informal 
network combined with the formal network but simultaneously impaired it, and they 
argue that resistance to change is considered to be one of the main attributes of 
communist organizations in eastern Germany (ibid. 1992). Therefore, the informal 
network progressively impaired the formal network and presented an alternative for it, 
strangely enough it simultaneously made it more solid. 
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      In brief, because East German scientists did not frequently explore the performance 
of employment relations we must refrain from generalizations. Unofficial agreements 
may have been a big part of the industrial relations system only in some places and for 
certain people. Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that unofficial agreements and to some 
extent informal bargaining and unofficial negotiations were present in most communist 
organizations and this may result in difficulties for the ongoing convergence of 
employment relations between East and West. 
      Some writers maintain that them-and-us feelings were present in the GDR (Kern and 
Schumann, 1985). In a corresponding manner, it was characteristic of East German 
workers to discriminate in the open between top and bottom, between the domain of 
members of government, managers and supervisors, and their own community. Other 
authors claim that this situation was similar to them-and-us feelings of West German 
employees in the past (Kreibig, 1992). Nevertheless, academic research has not 
specifically or in detail explored them-and-us feelings. In addition, it has to be debated 
whether them-and-us feelings prevailed for identical reasons in both parts of Germany. 
There is no empirical data to support that the division found between top and bottom was 
connected to class and property issues. 
      From one point of view some writers define the unofficial system as a genuine work 
community and emphasize the psychological significance of the GDR collective 
(Gensior, 1992). These communities represented companionship, enthusiasm, harmony 
and a moral philosophy. Furthermore, there is evidence for the influence of both physical 
and psychological factors of the unofficial system on people’s daily decisions (Diewald, 
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1995). This judgement is in agreement with the opinion that the consequences and the 
repercussions of the informal networks vary in proportion to the individual. 
      From another point of view lots of unpublished data endorse an extensive 
disillusionment by most blue-collar and white-collar workers, however, the point that 
trade union membership in eastern Germany was high is significant. This reinforces the 
hypothesis that the prime motive for entering the state union was its social functions. 
      A review of evidence provided in the literature on employees’ earlier feelings, 
suggests that most East German employees were discontent with a number of workplace 
activities, had some kind of them-and-us feelings for their employers, and unity with their 
fellow workers. They perceived the FDGB as not representative of them and blamed 
external actors for their difficulties. This evidence may assist to explain the feelings of 
workers since the unification, although they do not apply to all East German employees. 
 
Shopfloor Stability versus Workplace Erosion 
 
The institutional base of the German industrial relations system, which has served as the pre-
condition of its past success, has been shrinking during the last two decades, increasing 
decentralization pressures within collective bargaining tend to undermine the division of labour 
between co-determination and collective bargaining, the current institutional developments of 
the industrial relations system leave serious doubts about the future of a successful model of co-
operative modernization. (Hassel, 1999) 
I argue against this explanation because of the enduring significance and dependability of 
the WC’s network, the continuing importance of the Vertrauensleute, Germany’s version 
of shop stewards, the regional and industry bargaining structures, and because of the 
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burgeoning German tripartite arrangements. Besides, this interpretation refers to the 
entire industrial relations system of Germany, on the other hand the questions emerging 
from the German unification and the significant discrepancies between the private and 
public sector are disregarded. 
      In a study supervised by the Employers’ Federation research and development 
institute of 300 companies it was discovered that 20 per cent of the directors regarded 
works councils’ importance as very high, 63.5 per cent regarded it as high, 11.5 per cent 
mediocre and just 3 per cent weak (Larmann and Niedenhoff, 2000). Similarly, 10 per 
cent of the people belonging to works councils regarded their job as very important, 54 
per cent regarded it as important and 34 per cent stated that it was relevant. During the 
nineties most of directors sought advise from works councils often or at the least 
sometimes. It appears that directors view works councils as a significant organization and 
seek advise from them constantly on a great number of topics. The directors in Germany 
openly questioned about works councils, they did not seem to perceive an erosion, 
illustrated in former studies (Kotthoff, 1994). 
Table 1: Management Consultation with Works Councils (%) 
 
Areas Often Sometimes Never No Answer 
Personnel Issues 73 22 1 4 
Working Time 71 25 1 3 
Restructuring 49 35 10 6 
Training 11 72 13 4 
Wages Levels 8 66 18 8 
Other Issues 22 47 2 28 
 
Source: Federation of Employers, 2002. 
      The 120,000 shop stewards are a substantial part of the relations between 
management and workers in industries because WCs are not allowed to demand industrial 
action and associate only with factory affairs (Murakami, 2000). The trade unions, via the 
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shop stewards, arrange industrial actions. They are very important particularly when 
taking into account collective bargaining, due to the fact that trade unions alone can reach 
local or sectoral collective agreements, and it is the shop stewards not the works councils, 
calling for any industrial action of either local or sectoral status (Metall, 2000). Besides, 
the shop stewards are engaged in collective bargaining as well as in areas like training. 
      Generally, since the eighties it is obvious that shop stewards have been indispensable 
in industrial action for working hours cut-backs (Eaton, 2000). Strikes caused a 
continuous cut-back of working time, from 40.1 hours in the eighties to 36.7 in West 
Germany and 38.7 in East Germany in the nineties (Hahlen, 2001). Besides, between the 
eighties and the nineties, the German trade unions arranged for collective agreements 
which reduced the income disparity between males and females. Though there is now a 
small income disparity of about 20 per cent before tax, between women and men, the 
German trade unions have effectively brought about greater income parity for males and 
females. 
Chart 1: The Closing Gender Wage Gap (%) 
 
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
13 
Source: IDW, 2001.    
      The growth of collective bargaining has been promoted by a combination of local 
agreements at company or sector level and of supportive measures and directives. Under 
the auspices of this system, a labour institution, notably IG Metall, can start negotiations 
in a district where a productive and cost effective part of the economy is situated and 
carry on to extend the provisions of that settlement by negotiating with local manager 
organizations at nationwide level (Knut and Lloyd, 2003). Besides, when a multi-sectoral 
union succeeds in reaching settlements in the metal working industry it can exert 
influence on labour institutions and manager organizations in other parts of the economy 
(Meyer, 1995). The magnitude of the multi-industrial union, IG Metall, helps to serve as 
an explanation for the fact that, even though Germany has only the 5
th
 position in the 
number of 19 OECD countries when we estimate the level of centralization of collective 
bargaining, it shares the 1
st
 position with Austria and Japan when we estimate the level of 
coordination (OECD, 1997).             
      Statistical data shows a quantitative expansion of local collective agreements, at this 
point about 50,000 collective agreements are implemented, and regularly, approximately 
7,000 to 8,000 are either settled or adjusted (Zachert, 1999). In 2000 managers reported 
collective agreements at 55,000, accounting for 70 per cent of employees, with a 20 per 
cent in West Germany and 29 per cent in East Germany of firms willingly complying 
with them (IDW, 2001). 
      A recent project has enquired into the late revival of tripartite agreements as a result 
of social pacts (Fajertag and Pochet, 1997). Tripartite arrangements are seen as the 
answer to increased economic globalization and public deficit restraints. In the period 
preceding European Monetary Union the German government had chosen to cooperate 
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with national economic factors to meet the convergence criteria, therefore participating in 
competitive corporatism (Rhodes, 1997). I think, nevertheless, that the general notion of 
social pacts is misinterpreted by emphasizing too much on cutting back wages to increase 
international competition. Other policies, such as decreasing social contributions and 
corporate tax to create jobs, and adjusting the welfare state to current economic trends, 
are at least as significant for social pacts as competitive wages and have to be taken into 
account (Schmitter and Grote, 1997).      
      Even though neoclassical criticism developed in IR in several countries, the 
neoclassical plan to cut back wages was not embraced in Germany (Strengelhofen and 
Wachter, 1995). A more solid assumption is that the neoclassical doctrine of the eighties 
and nineties did not bring about an erosion of the relations between management and 
workers in industries and German unions have never accepted the neoclassical model. A 
high union membership among politicians over the past ten years shows that labour 
institutions are incorporated in the economic and social order of Germany. In the German 
parliamentary session of 1949, 28 per cent of the members of parliament were trade 
unionists, by 1969 membership amounted to 55 per cent and, by 1980, 62 per cent, by 
1990 nevertheless dropped to 40 per cent, however by 1998 built up to more than 50 per 
cent (Pege, 1999). More recently, in spite of the fact that union density dropped to an all 
time low, approximately 75 per cent of the Social Democrat members of parliament are 
trade unionists and exercise power on the governance of the country (BusinessWeek, 
28/06/04).  
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      Several political statements call to mind that the German unification has not been 
completely settled, and there are very important socioeconomic discrepancies and 
irregularities between West Germany and East Germany. 
Even six years after unification, and only three years before Hassel’s erosion thesis was 
published, East German purchasing power was $US9,000 in 1996 compared with West German 
purchasing power of US$23,000, indicating a significant disparity. (Klikauer, 2002) 
 Early in the new millennium, in regard to purchasing power, there is still a great 
disparity between East and West Germany. 
States in the West ranked between 109 and 92, compared with states in the East which ranked 
only between 81 and 78 in the year 2000, in the same year, unemployment in the West was 
recorded at 8 per cent, unemployment for the East was at 20 per cent, with New Branderburg at 
23.7 per cent, the town of Sonneberg registered the lowest unemployment in the former East 
Germany, with 11.8 per cent, still well above the Western average. (ibid. 2002) 
It might be a consequence of the unification approach of the fundamentalist Kohl 
government, that did not support first-rate subsidization in East Germany, but it backed 
the advance of screwdriver plants, in other words, small facility retailers in West 
Germany (Dahne, 2001). Unification difficulties are evident in the migration from East to 
West Germany. In 1998, almost a decade since unification, 182,500 migrated from East 
to West, in 1999, migration went up to 195,500 (IDW, 2001). In the late nineties, the 
number of social welfare beneficiaries in West Germany decreased to some extent, even 
though East Germany experienced a small proportional rise. Besides, economic 
development was greater in West Germany than it was in East Germany. Following the 
collapse of the Iron Curtain and the completion of the reunification process, an extra 
3,000,000 people of German origin came back from the Eastern Block since the turn of 
the century. About 2,200,000 of those people returned from the independent states of the 
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Soviet Union, 575,000 came from Poland and another 220,000 from Romania (MPI, 
2004).  
      In theory, the unification through employment legislation in Germany has been 
effectively attained, even though socioeconomic integration appears to have been 
delayed. It is clear that it was less difficult to form a set of labour laws in Germany than 
to develop an economically coordinated mechanism (Hyman, 1996; Klikauer, 2002). One 
more difficulty in the formation of the political structure in Germany has been a trade 
union membership decline. Though income equality between West Germany and East 
Germany has been nearly accomplished by trade unions and industrial relations 
organizations have been established, politically and economically East Germany and 
West Germany continue to be rather conflicting, as the data displays. Research has 
disregarded this in such a manner that it has belittled the part of the public sector in the 
IR of Germany. 
      Hassel and Kotthoff  have displayed a false viewpoint about Germany. WCs continue 
to be powerful, and they complement the role of the shop stewards. The decentralization 
of bargaining continues to be at the sectoral level, and the tripartite foundations to the IR 
model appear to be solid. If the topic is transformation, the research that has analyzed the 
discrepancies between West Germany and East Germany must serve as an example. 
 
A Coordinated Strategy for Reunification 
 
      The socioeconomic prosperity of West Germany was sustained by an inclusive 
structure of associations between the main participants, like financial establishments, 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
17 
governing bodies, employer organizations, and trade unions. Despite the fact that West 
Germany was a capitalist society, plenty of integrated bargaining took place in influential 
sectors for scholars to use explicit definitions like bargained political economy or to 
make reference to democratic corporatism (Katzenstein, 1985). Of great significance 
were lasting and coordinated associations between financial establishments and big 
companies. Scholars defined this society as an outstanding model of a coordinated market 
economy where reward schemes helped companies to make lasting arrangements, 
improve work skills, and move to more affluent sectors, they favoured this kind of 
political economy against the less integrated and mostly less effective Anglo-American 
system (Soskice, 1990; Turner 1998). 
      While people in Germany expressed dissatisfaction about the state of the economy 
and debated for important changes, people abroad, with the advantage of a comparative 
approach, became great admirers (Weaver, 1995). However, German scholars gave an 
account of the virtuous circle of government and development that generated dynamic 
domestic labour markets and resilience, new expertise, and diversified, quality production 
(Streeck, 1992). My own analysis of Germany will illustrate the connection between 
works councils and the adaptability and endurance of trade unions in the complex 
situation of modern world markets. An empirical study of negotiated adjustment in the 
metal works sector provides valid data for the productive cooperation of directors, works 
councils, and trade unions, and the trend for an innovative and resilient work structure 
(Thelen, 1991). In a related empirical study, Ferner and Hyman suggest that the 
combination of well organized trade unions and high density is the origin of industrial 
relations flexibility in modern times, and they also speak of the important services of the 
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works councils for trade unions as a particularly sophisticated form of articulation, to 
provide an explanation for the robustness of industrial relations (Crouch, 1993). 
      The capacity to adjust to incremental adjustment and convert into models of a 
different kind, as part of an effective and comprehensive national structure is crucial to 
the attainment of social partnership in post unification times (Katzenstein, 1989). The 
attempt by the Christian Democrat leader Helmut Kohl in the eighties to mastermind a 
transformation into a market economy with trade unions of little authority was 
unsuccessful in changing West German industrial relations (Webber, 1992). Trade unions 
were found to be solid, labour institutions emerged as resilient, and manager 
organizations regarded the policy of the chancellor as wrong. Since the great success of 
the German Metalworkers’ Union strike for less working hours, relations between the 
various participants continued to be firm during the prosperity times of the eighties. 
      Regardless of the demands for transformation by managers and unionists at the same 
time, relations of partnership seemed to be solid. 
In the pattern-setting metal industry, the 1987 bargaining round was peacefully resolved in the 
continuing trade-off between a shorter workweek and more flexible working hours, underpinned 
by moderate wage gains in a three year contract. (Turner, 1998) 
By the end of the eighties, managers and trade unionists did not seem to have a clue of 
the forthcoming social disturbance. 
Talk in the metal industry was of a tough bargaining round and possible strike in 1990, as IG 
Metall prepared its final push toward the 35-hour week while employers grew increasingly 
resistant in the face of rising costs. (ibid. 1998) 
It turned out that the beginning of the nineties was not troublesome, after the collapse of 
the Berlin wall and prior to German unification, a settlement based on the two former 
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arrangements was agreed. Many scholars suggested that successful incremental 
adjustments will carry on with systems of bargaining stamped by periodic controversy 
and general agreement (Katzenstein, 1989). As productivity increased in the early 
nineties, both managers and trade unionists received the benefits of social partnership and 
had no desire to assault each other. 
      Table 2 displays evidence about the provinces which had an above average 
productivity growth in the years between 1990 and 2000. During the eighties, eleven of 
the seventy one classified districts had an above average productivity growth, and that 
was also the case for nine of those provinces during the nineties (Geppert et al. 2006). In 
the eighties, it was in particular the large regions such as Munich, Rhine-Main and 
Hamburg that had an above average initial level to confirm this trend. But the 
industrialized province of Nuremberg, as well as the classified districts and sectors of 
Starkenburg and South Schleswig-Holstein, also had an above average productivity 
growth in the nineties. 
Table 2: Regions with Above-Average Initial Level and Above-Average Growth of Productivity 
 
 West Germany = 100 Change in index value 
 1990 1990 - 2000 
Munich 118,0 20,4 
Starkenburg 101,6 15,3 
Hamburg region 110,9 9,5 
Central Franconia  104,7 6,3 
Danube-Iler 100,1 4,9 
South West Schleswig-Holstein 108,1 3,5 
Rhine-Main 127,9 2,9 
Lake Constance-Upper Swabia 101,4 0,2 
Düsseldorf 117,8 0,2 
 
Source: Federal Employment Agency, 2001. 
 
      The success of West Germany strengthened the endurance of organizations and added 
to the collapse of the state controlled economies of the central and eastern European 
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countries. During the eighties, the years when statesmen in western European countries 
were concerned at eurosclerosis and occupied with European Community affairs, 
communist regimes grew constantly alert to their state controlled economies being unable 
to maintain progress like the western nations. New leaders took over to make the regimes 
less severe, and to carry on with reforms that could restore the economy. When the 
amendments ultimately denied central and eastern European upper classes the armed 
forces support for their governments, the Iron Curtain collapsed. 
      This was in reality an unprecedented economic experimentation. As the state 
controlled socioeconomic regimes in central and eastern Europe broke down, as 
statesmen asserted their confidence in a free market economy, big issues came forth. Can 
those nations achieve an unconstrained conversion? To what a degree will they have to 
dispose of the old fashioned organizations to move on, and to what a degree will they 
have to secure former establishments? How long will the demanded renovation last? Can 
they draw level with the western countries? Distinct methods came up in Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Iankova, 1997). All the same, 
in Germany though the problems were identical, the situation was unparalleled (Liebert 
and Merkel, 1991). Can politically well founded and financially well balanced West 
Germany assimilate East Germany, population 16 million? Can this be fulfilled with 
avoiding damaging solidity and prosperousness? Can East Germans adapt to a system of 
social democracy and free market, adjust it to the new conditions, and draw even with the 
western nations? Will the institutional expansion emerge as a viable alternative? 
      A very important mission during the nineties was to integrate the new land into West 
Germany on the foundations of parliamentary democracy and a free economy. The 
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determined strategy was organizational expansion to the former German Democratic 
Republic, and the elimination of obsolete establishments so that an effective adoption of 
the East by western organizations becomes possible (Baylis, 1993). Nevertheless, things 
were more complicated, organizations were indeed expanded to a great extent from West 
to East, but this took place under the circumstances of a financial crisis, massive 
redundancies, and the inheritance of outdated techniques and organizational 
fragmentation. The results were diverse and ambivalent, incorporating contemporaneous 
and competing views of success and failure, of development and stagnation, of social 
partnership recreated in the former GDR or controversy, depression and rejection 
(Jacoby, 1995). 
      Right after the collapse of the Berlin wall, western trade unions started to develop 
associations with their East German peers. At first, the developing associations were 
cautious, founded upon personal and team engagements at various stages of production 
and trade union activities. Much the same as other organizations, unions were not ready 
for the downfall of East Germany and the forthcoming reunification. The DGB and the 
western trade unions were hesitant at first, unconvinced about the perfect policy in a 
unique situation, they did not wish to interfere with the domestic issues of the new land 
and its acknowledged institutions. 
      At the time that West German companies started purchasing portions of the economy 
from the GDR, manager organizations stepped in to set up business in the new land. In 
the same way as unionists identified the need to provide for the East, manager 
organizations realized straight away that unless they make a move, they may lose ground 
in the West (Bispinck, 1991). In the early nineties, the Federation of German Employers 
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was the first to make a move, they enlarged manager organizations and they encouraged 
the foundation of brand-new departments. Later on, manager organizations were founded 
all over the GDR, each associated with proper institutions of the Federation of German 
Employers (Ettl and Heikenroth, 1996). About the same time, the DGB publicized a 
declaration asking for the expansion of the West German collective bargaining model 
eastward, and the underlying framework was eventually in the right position for the 
opening bargaining rounds in the months to follow. 
      It is of great significance to stress the influence given to trade unionists because of the 
expansion of labour organizations from West Germany to East Germany. 
The transfer of codetermination law and the election of works councils all across eastern 
Germany in 1990-91 made the unions immediately capable of offering resources, training, and 
other benefits of union membership to newly elected works councillors. (Turner, 1998) 
Those people, prior to and following their appointment as works councillors, regularly 
turned into major trade unionists on the shop-floor, enlisting other associated employees 
and organizing their own society.  
Under codetermination law, the new eastern works councillors could claim a formal and 
protected position in the workplace, from which they could both negotiate with management on 
behalf of the workforce and build up the union. (ibid. 1998) 
      In an outstanding organizational modernization, delegates of proprietors, managers, 
and employees consented in the early nineties to underpin the advance of Employment 
and Training Companies (Knuth, 1993). The concept, brought forward and supported by 
trade unionists, was to hire dismissed employees at idle factories to raise productivity and 
subsidize training facilities that may result in long-term employment for the unemployed. 
As a consequence of the nineties settlements, Employment and Training Companies were 
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established all over Germany by the Federal Labour Bureau (Knuth, 1997). It is not for 
sure whether the Employment and Training Companies can bring about new jobs, or 
mostly help to conceal the redundancies. 
 
Co-Determination Rights of the Works Council 
 
      The recent publications are in disagreement and often abstract about the prospective 
evolution fluctuating between opinions emphasizing the flexibility of the structure to 
forecasting its impending disintegration. Admittedly, the prospects for the workplace 
relations in Germany and in specific the common industrial policies are subject to 
decisions made now and in the near future (Frege, 2003; Streek, 1997). The 
circumstances may be associated with England in the eighties, when the scholars were 
disunited about the Thatcher amendments that caused new industrial relations, 
culminating in continuity vs. change scholastic arguments which presented plenty of 
inconsistent facts (Bassett, 1986; Batstone, 1984). A procedure of extensive structural 
economic change has taken place in Germany, in reduced circumstances, since the early 
nineties, and the largely effective development is the most important reason for the late 
economic improvement. Co-determination has not obstructed the progress of this 
organizational transformation, the purpose of which has been to adapt to increasing 
international competition and economic globalization. To the opposite effect, in several 
occasions co-determination has sustained institutional change, particularly in those issues 
in which adjustments have necessitated the involvement of employees (Kommision 
Mitbestimmung, 1998).           
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      An important issue is whether decentralization expands the capacity and autonomy of 
works councils in relation to unions or WCs are progressively integrated into the trade 
unions’ discipline, and consequently unionists grow more significant at shop floor level 
due to the works councils’ progressive dependency on their advisory support. 
      There are more publications on WCs relations with executives than with trade unions 
(Frege, 2002). A general perception is the development of co-managerial works councils. 
However, these writings are defective because of the inaccurate descriptions. An 
interpretation of co-determination is that works councils are progressively and willingly 
associated with decision-making on institutional conversion by directors that is taken as 
an indication of their augmented authority upon executives (Frege, 2003). Some scholars 
in Germany they suggest that WCs hold a particularly strong influence on management 
decision-making (Muller-Jentsch and Seitz, 1998). Nevertheless, the publications do not 
provide us with a persuading explanation why an augmentation of works councils’ 
authority, particularly if they are subject to managerial pressure, it is by itself more 
influential upon decision-making. 
      Co-ordination is a widely investigated area of study in diverse subjects such as 
psychology, sociology or political economy. Though there have been some employment 
relations studies on collaboration between unionists and directors as contracted associates 
there have been practically no studies on the preceding circumstances of employment 
coordination between the unionists and the directors (Gold, 1986; McKersie and Walton, 
1991; Spieb and Nerdinger, 1998). I make reference to the theories of a literature review 
of inter-institutional coordination where the investigations on the determining factors of 
collaboration between firms were carried out by organizational theorists (Smith et al. 
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1995). Power and conflict theories that pay attention to discrimination or prejudice and 
inconsistencies between organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Modeling theories 
that investigate the socio-economic learning approach in promoting collaboration and 
therefore emphasize the significance of compliance and uniformity of coordinative 
models through formerly established class and institutional attitudes (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Social structure theories that stress the importance of internal and external 
determinants in promoting coordination (Blau, 1974).  
      The following analysis derives from a questionnaire sent to 485 works councillors by 
the Deutsche Postgewerkshaft, including telecommunications, mail services and postal 
union members, and by the Industriegewerkshaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie, 
incorporating mining, chemical and gas enterprises. 
      In respect of the present employment settlements 40 percent of the works councillors 
questioned engaged to a greater degree in industrial or institutional amendments than 
decreed by legislation. Besides, in 66 percent of the occasions that had a working time 
settlement, the board of directors and the works council decided jointly, in 8 percent 
separately and in 26 percent the works council by itself. Additionally, 45 percent of the 
works councils investigated had the objective to bargain work security as a trade for 
variable working time settlements and 37 percent attained it. Lastly, in 41 percent of the 
companies salaries were bargained higher than the sector-level arrangement, that was 
below the 66 percent higher than the sector-level arrangement discovered by the 
Wirtschafts-und Socialwissenschaftliches Institut (Schafer, 2001). The evidence endorses 
that the works councillors questioned are defined as powerful in effect and 
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notwithstanding the demand for delegation and collaboration difficulties, they persist as 
significant in the process of decision-making. 
      The opinion of councillors about unionists, though often the same people, was 
generally favourable. In comparison with the other scenarios of institutional change and 
organizational transformation mentioned above, the outcomes do not display signals of 
alienation and augmented liberalization or extended union integration. They are faithful 
works councillors who are esteemed by the unionists and who respect the unionists’ 
sponsorship instead of becoming their opponents. For instance, 58 percent disputed that 
membership coordination is not a significant issue at shopfloor level and 64 percent 
argued that collaboration is critical for their negotiation power. Therefore, to the degree 
those feelings demonstrate behaviour, a great percentage of works councils appeared to 
carry on performing this important duty for the unionists, as opposed to growing 
apprehension between the unionists that works councils’ endeavour is declining. 
Table 3: Works Councillors’ Perceptions of Works Council-Union Relations: Five-Point Scale 
 
Variable 
 
Mean SD 
We have more important 
problems than membership 
2.64 1.16 
Success in organizing is not 
directly important 
2.58 1.22 
I represent the interests of my 
workforce 
3.31 1.03 
My union interferes too much 
with the works councils’ work 
1.99 0.68 
I am proud to be a member of my 
union 
3.83 0.88 
I completely share the values and 
principles of my union 
3.40 0.96 
In general employees need the 
union less now than they used to 
1.77 1.00 
Our union has an outdated image 
 
2.51 1.09 
It becomes more difficult to sell 
union success 
2.85 1.11 
Being cooperative with 
management 
2.68 1.02 
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There are too few unions officials 
who engage in membership 
3.05 1.09 
My union is too far away from its 
base 
2.83 1.08 
My union values my union work 
 
3.53 0.86 
My union take my opinion as 
works councillor seriously 
3.72 0.83 
All in all I am satisfied with the 
support 
3.64 1.02 
The work relationship is good 
 
3.57 1.07 
 
Source: DPG and IG BCE, 2003. 
      The feelings of works councillors about the directors were diverse but favourable, 66 
percent defined the workplace relations as coordinative. About 80 percent thought of 
executives as not anti-union or impeding future membership. Furthermore, just 28 
percent felt that directors did not have strong associations with the trade unionists. 
Almost 50 percent accepted that executives recognized the self determination of works 
councils avoiding to extend their authority over the works councillors. A comparable 
percentage also described the directors as reliable associates. Nevertheless, there was a 
different opinion about the building of confidence over time, 44 percent believed that the 
magnitude of reliability persisted as unchanged during the past ten years, as opposed to 
38 percent who perceived that they had more confidence in earlier years. 
Table 4: Works Councillors’ Perceptions of Works Council-Management Relations: Five-Point Scale 
 
Variable 
 
Mean SD 
The relationship is cooperative 
 
3.39 1.03 
Management is a trustworthy 
partner 
3.14 1.01 
Ten years ago I had more trust in 
management than today 
2.94 1.14 
Management is not intimidating 
potential new union members 
4.02 0.98 
Management has a good 
relationship with the union 
3.12 1.04 
Management accepts the works 
council 
3.05 1.08 
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Our works council was much 
stronger ten years ago 
2.32 0.98 
Our works council does not have 
much influence at this workplace 
2.02 0.82 
Management is generally less 
willing to compromise 
3.07 1.06 
There will always be divergent 
interests between employers 
4.10 0.88 
The differences between workers’ 
and company’s interests 
3.47 1.10 
Today’s works councillors are co-
managers 
3.11 1.17 
What is best for the company is 
also best for the workforce 
2.30 0.99 
Performance-related pay is more 
fair than equal pay for equal work 
2.88 1.13 
Industry-level agreements should 
become more flexible 
2.73 1.14 
Globalization not management to 
be blamed 
3.04 1.09 
 
Source: DPG and IG BCE, 2003. 
      The first objective of this section was to examine the importance of employment 
coordination for German industries with a view to contribute to the continuity versus 
change academic debate for Germany. Instead of investigating advances in the context of 
industrial settlements or actual relations like in other readings this part put forward the 
necessity to investigate works councillors’ behaviours in an effort to demonstrate the 
importance of works councils. 
      The second objective of this section was to make a substantial effort to analyze the 
determinants of coordination which are defined by power, modeling and social structure 
theories. Further research is evidently required to endorse those exploratory outcomes. In 
detail, councillors’ assistance to constructive power relations with chief executives was 
most emphatically dependent on councillors’ collaborative behaviours. From another 
perspective, coordinative behaviours in this bisectoral study were not affected by 
organizational characteristics like industry, company, or occupation of trade unionists and 
works councillors. Therefore, the association between directors and works council was to 
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a considerable degree bureaucratic and not entirely contingent upon individual qualities 
of the actors. However, this does not convey that collaboration between the two parties is 
an inherent organizational characteristic of the German model. To the opposite effect, it 
is a continuously discussed procedure of the developing dynamics of executives and 
works councillors. In the strongly organized environment of German employment 
relations, the coordination of directors and works councillors is conditional on everyday 
power relations. This may be taken as a significant result for the labour relations 
literature. It indicates that though the constitutional sponsorship of industrial democracy 
is essential it is certainly not enough to ensure collaborative industrial relations. 
Nevertheless, statutory powers for works councils may assist to produce a much better 
power equilibrium that appears to be a critical precondition for coordination. 
      A democratic society requires an economic environment in which disputes are 
resolved through conference and not by coercion. Co-determination is a prerequisite for 
this. The objectives of co-determination are equality of capital and work, democracy in 
the economy, social development, and control of economic power (BMAS, 1995). The 
co-determination rights ensure employee involvement, employee representation through 
the works council, as well as engagement in economic planning and decision-making.  
Co-determination in Germany becomes manifest on two levels, establishment level and 
company and group level. Distinct legislation governs the individual systems on the two 
levels. (Page, 2006). To conclude, the works council rights are defined as information, 
inspection, supervision, recommendation, give advice, opposition, veto, negotiation, 
initiation, and the obligation to agree.     
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A Rhenish Variant of the Anglo-Saxon Model 
 
      This study attempts to make a contribution to the main part of investigation by 
demonstrating some concepts about the potential German transformation. In general the 
current situation can be described as incremental adjustment in the German version of the 
stakeholder economy. The adjustments have taken place in the sphere of institutions and 
of practice. In the sphere of institutions, the post-unification alliance of stakeholders 
affecting the firm has not been substituted for or suppressed by shareholder value. This 
post-unification alliance has rather been augmented through the incorporation of 
institutional investors into the alliance. Thus one may argue for the manifestation of an 
augmented stakeholder coalition in Germany. In the sphere of practices, the standard 
objectives which German firms have concentrated upon since the unification have been 
enhanced by as opposed to have been substituted for shareholder interests. In comparison 
with the version of shareholder principles in America and Britain, the German version of 
shareholder principles is described as negotiated shareholder value, with a couple of 
outstanding characteristics (Vitols, 2003). The execution of methods devised to serve 
shareholder interests for the benefit of institutional investors has to be negotiated with the 
associates of the stakeholder alliance, especially the banks and works councils. To reach 
equilibrium of control in a reinforced stakeholder alliance, methods devised to attain 
shareholder principles are ordinarily modified throughout the course of action to consider 
along with other factors the benefits for various stakeholders. New methods, like 
remuneration incentives were devised to bring into line the interests of shareholders, 
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directors, and workers, therefore the German version is distinct from the one in America 
and Britain, especially where employee involvement is concerned. 
Table 5: Regulations on Shareholding of Financial Institutions and Nonfinancial Corporations 
 
 U.K. Germany 
Banks No special regulations Holdings greater than 10% 
Life Insurance Companies Voluntary self-limitation  Holding of shares up to 20% 
Other Insurance Companies Same as above No regulations 
Mutual Funds Same as above No regulations 
Pension Funds Same as abobe No regulations 
 
Source: Institute for Fiscal and Monetary Policy, 1999. 
      In fact Germany has grown into one of the most distinguished and illustrious examples  
of a stakeholder structure of corporate management. An extensive international research 
has displayed that Germany had the largest blocks of shareholders concentration amongst 
the nations investigated (Barca and Becht, 2001). As chart 2 demonstrates, the median 
value of the voting blocks for German firms quoted on the stock exchange was fifty 
seven percent. In comparison with America, the median value of the voting blocks for 
large firms quoted on the New York Stock Exchange was 5.4%. 
Chart 2: Median Size of Largest Shareholding Block (%) 
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Source: WZB, 2003. 
      In a further attempt to make a contribution to this knowledge, my study also suggests 
one or two general concepts about the transition of the German stakeholder economy. 
Based on the differentiation described initially between the sphere of institutions and the 
sphere of practices, one of these concepts is that the reorganization of institutions has 
supported the manifestation of a hybrid structure where large companies and works 
councils have an important part. The outcome of this development is an augmented 
stakeholder coalition, which employs the incorporation of shareholder principles into the 
post-unification alliance of stakeholders, of which the most significant associates were 
banks and works councils. 
      Lately, quite a few scholars have argued that the insider and outsider division is not 
adequate to identify the transformation of stakeholder systems (Cioffi, 2000; Goyer, 
2002). In Germany, for instance, though the economic environment and its effect on 
business administration have developed into an Anglo-Saxon variety, labour has 
continued to be influential on the shopfloor with works councils and trade unions. Efforts 
to explain this transition incorporate the notion of hybrid models, multi-dimensional 
structures for organizing business administration networks, and greater emphasis on the 
procedure of transformation (Aguilera and Jackson; 2003, Höpner, 2003; Vitols, 2002).   
      In spite of the decrease of blockholding in the mid nineties, Germany is to this time 
well ahead of the United States. The median value of the largest shareholders in German 
quoted firms in the year 2000 was about sixty percent, in contrast with 5%, for firms 
quoted on the New York Stock Exchange. With a prolonged decrease of 5 percent every 
five years in Germany, it will take fifty-five years to drop to the levels of the United 
States. The typical definition of a large shareholding, or blockholding, is that at least 5 
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percent of the total outstanding shares of the company are held by the same owner 
(Vitols, 2003).  
      In this regard a contrasting of the Dow Jones and the Deutsches Aktienindex, the 30 
large firms in both cases, is quite informative. In America the median value of the large 
investors in the Dow Jones is 5.3%. About half of the firms had no large shareholders. 
Investigating the firms in the Deutsches Aktienindex, the index of the thirty large German 
quoted firms, one observes the prolonged effect of the largest investors. Just 3 of the 
Deutsches Aktienindex firms in the year 2002 had not a large investor, Adidas-Salomon, 
Deutsche Bank, and Siemens. Of those business with large investors, insurance 
establishments were the largest investors at 8 of the business, against institutions and 
families at 4, financial establishments at 2, and other business at 3. 
Table 6: Largest Shareholders in the 30 Dow Jones and DAX 30 Companies 
 
Company Largest Shareholding %  Company Largest Shareholding % 
Dow Jones  DAX  
3M Co. 5.8 Adidas-Salomon AG >5 
Alcoa Inc. 10.3 Allianz AG 23 
American Express Co. 11.4 Altana AG 50.1 
AT & T Corp. 7.7 BASF AG 9.2 
Boeing Co. 5.3 Bayer AG 5 
Caterpillar Inc. >5 Bayerische Hypo-und 26.3 
Citigroup Inc. >5 Bayerische Motoren 48 
Coca-Cola Co. >5 Commerzbank AZ 10 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours >5 DaimerChrysler AG 12.5 
Eastman Kodak Co. 11.6 Deutsche Bank AG >5 
Exxon Mobil Corp. >5 Deutsche Lufthansa AG 10.1 
General Electric Co. >5 Deutsche Post AG 71.3 
General Motors Corp. 5.6 Deutsche Telecom AG 43.1 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 10.4 E.ON.AG. 7.6 
Home Depot Inc. 6.1 Epcos AG 12.5 
Honeywell International 5.2 Fresenius Medical Care 50.3 
Intel Corp. 5.3 Henkel KGaA 58.2 
International Business >5 Infineon Technologies 71.9 
International Paper Co. 6.9 Linde AG 13.1 
J.P. Morgan Chase >5 MAN AG 36.1 
Johnson & Johnson >5 Metro AG 56.5 
McDonald’s Corp. 9.5 MLP AG 27.3 
Merck & Co. Inc. >5 Muncher AG 24.8 
Microsoft Corp. 12.3 RWE AG 13.3 
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Philip Morris Cos. Inc. 7 SAP AG 62.5 
Procter & Gamble. Co. >5 Schering AG 10.6 
SBC Communications >5 Siemens AG 6.9 
United Technologies >5 ThyssenKrupp AG 16.9 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 38.4 TUI AG 29.1 
Walt Disney Co. 10.8 Volkswagen  20 
Median 5.3 Median 21.5 
 
Source: Company annual reports and company websites, 2002. 
      The growing significance of institutional investors is based on their capacity to take 
hold of a larger allocation of stock purchases by primary shareholders, such as families. 
The late part of the nineties was accurately defined by this advancement. Families in the 
United States and the United Kingdom built up their contributions in stock purchases. 
The firms of these nations were highly valued, and the institutional investors 
progressively searched for German stocks. The foreign stock purchases in Germany 
expanded in quick succession in the late part of the nineties, and in 1999 reached about 
130 billion Euros (Deutsche Bundesbang, 2003). Families and Works Councils in 
Germany expanded their share of savings in bonds and mutual funds in the late part of the 
nineties, and in 2000 came up to the sum of around 80 billion Euros (ibid. 2003). 
      Numerous explanations of the diminished responsibility of the workers in Germany 
were given about the bargaining structure, mainly on the downgrade of the size of trade 
union density and the exodus of some directors from managers’ organizations. Inside 
business, in comparison, the works councils have evolved into a more significant power 
standing for the benefits of the employees, and exert influence on decision making at 
both the factory level and the enterprise level (Thelen and Kume, 2003; Vitols, 2003). 
      As analyzed before, the effect of institutional investors as well as of trade unions and 
works councils as stakeholders has been miscalculated in numerous explanations of the 
German variant, not including the firms in which the district managers have a substantial 
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proprietorship part. Even though more district managers have proclaimed the clear 
objective to make firms private, progression in this regard has been quite moderate, and 
the trend for the most part has been to denationalize firms to a limited extent. 
      What kind of facts can advocate this theory as opposed to the arguments of 
conversion and no adjustment? One can anticipate proof of a bargaining methodology, in 
which the initial requirements of an associate of the alliance are faced with opposition or 
different recommendations from other associates of the alliance. One can also anticipate 
that when antagonism is substantial, the initial requirements for shareholder interests will 
be either adjusted or excluded. As a consequence of the motive forces of this reinforced 
stakeholder alliance, one may as well anticipate an adjustment of the techniques in 
German companies which consider along with other factors the needs of institutional 
investors, with avoidance of full-time conversion to the Anglo-Saxon version of 
shareholder principles. 
      Comprehensive indices of firm praxis are in agreement with the general notion that 
company techniques in Germany have actually been adjusted, but continue to be distant 
from the Anglo-Saxon model. An illustration of this is the utilization of stock options to 
bring into line the interests of directors and shareholders. An amendment in company 
regulations in the late nineties sanctioned German firms to initiate stock options, and 
made it simple for executives to be linked with dividend yields. From that time until now 
many German companies have actually introduced stock options. Nevertheless, German 
enterprises utilize stock option plans to a smaller extent than American firms. 
Table 7: Stock Options as a % of Total Shares in the 30 Dow Jones and DAX 30 Companies  
 
Company Options as a %  Company Options as a % 
Dow Jones  DAX  
3M Co. 8.8 Adidas-Salomon AG 1.1 
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Alcoa Inc. 8.7 Allianz AG 0.3 
American Express Co. 11.0 Altana AG 1.7 
AT & T Co. 8.9 BASF AG 0.5 
Boeing Co. 3.4 Bayer AG 0.0 
Caterpillar Inc. 9.4 Bayerische Hypo-und 0.0 
Citigroup Inc. 7.2 Bayerische Motoren 0.0 
Coca-Cola Co. 5.7 Commerzbank AG 0.0 
E.I. Dupont de Nemours 6.7 Daimer Chrysler AG 4.2 
Eastman Kodak Co. 17.3 Deutsche Bank AG 2.7 
Exxon Mobil Corp. 3.9 Deutsche Lufthansa AG 0.4 
General Electric Co. 3.6 Deutsche Post AG 0.5 
General Motors Co. 3.7 Deutsche Telecom AG 0.2 
Hewlett- Packard Co. 11.2 E.ON.AG 0.6 
Home Depot Inc. 3.0 Epcos AG 0.9 
Honeywell International 6.6 Fresenius Medical Care 2.6 
Intel Corp. 11.5 Henkel KGaA 0.2 
International Business 9.3 Infineon Technologies 1.8 
International Paper Co. 6.0 Linde AG 0.0 
J.P. Morgan Chase 9.8 MAN AG 0.0 
Johnson & Johnson 5.4 Metro AG 0.0 
McDonald’s Corp. 11.6 MLP AG 0.0 
Merck & Co. Inc. 6.6 Muncher AG 0.1 
Microsoft Corp. 16.6 RWE AG 1.0 
Philip Morris Cos. Inc. 6.4 SAP AG 2.2 
Procter & Gamble Co. 7.7 Schering AG 1.1 
SBC Communications 4.0 Siemens AG 1.4 
United Technologies 7.2 ThyssenKrupp AG 1.5 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 1.1 TUI AG 0.0 
Walt Disney Co. 9.0 Volkswagen AG 1.7 
Average 7.7 Average 0.9 
 
Source: Company annual reports and company websites, 2002. 
      This section argues that the recent developments in Germany may be described as 
significant, but fundamentally incremental adjustments in the stakeholder structure of 
corporate management. In this regard it differs from the arguments of no essential 
changes and of large scale convergence to the Anglo-Saxon shareholder version. The 
most critical question for corporate management and organizational change in late years 
in Germany has been how to adjust to handle the requirements for the fulfillment of 
shareholder interests. Those adjustments have been evaluated in two spheres.  
      In the sphere of institutions, the principal adaptation of the post-unification 
stakeholder alliance was the incorporation of institutional investors into an augmented 
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stakeholder coalition. In the sphere of practices, a structure of negotiated shareholder 
value becomes apparent. German corporate governance provides for an alternative that is 
different from Anglo-Saxon business administration, in the procedure by which decision 
making occurs, and in the developments that this bargaining process results in. There is 
support for a negotiating procedure, in other words, a negotiated shareholder value, 
which often culminates in the adaptation of the initial requirements for shareholding 
interests when social partners of the stakeholder alliance disagree. Macroeconomic 
evidence, for instance in the utilization of stock options and the partition of value added 
among stakeholders, also confirms this explanation of a Rhenish variant of the Anglo-
Saxon model of shareholding interests.       
 
From Path Dependency to Organizational Change 
 
      This section draws attention to the reappraisal of some concepts that help to analyze 
organizational transformation. The incremental adjustments taking place in most parts of 
Europe have brought up the topic of institutional change, and the comparison of several 
factors that were formerly ill defined. Despite focusing upon a limited number of areas, 
this analysis can bring forward issues particularly important for a more comprehensive 
interpretation of the general topic of organizational change. This section concentrates on 
the concept of corporate management, but further associated concepts can also benefit 
from analyzing organizational transformation in a practical and theoretic context. For 
instance, such is the case of the well known conception of civil society, now reemerging 
together with the innovative practices in central and eastern European countries 
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(Leszczenko, 2002; Reichard, 2002). Other notions calling for a reappraisal may as well 
apply to the issues of governmental deficiencies and industrial democracy which have 
been high on the agenda because of the enlargement of the European Union. In addition, 
it may be said that as a consequence of the emergence of Europeanization, the necessity 
to review the variety of academic opinions has become stronger. This equally affects the 
issue of corporate governance as primarily related to business structures and the business 
environment, and the broad meaning of governance in the core political context 
(Federowicz, 2003; Grabbe, 2000). The issue of democratic deficiency is also related to 
the problem of poor or premature democratic consolidation in the CEE (Mokrzycki et al. 
2002).  
      This analysis offers a balanced point of view about the motive forces of 
organizational transformation to serve as an explanation for past and future dependency 
and the attitudes of actors. In the first part I propose a suitable structure for East and West 
convergence, maintaining the proposition on the grounds of organizational 
resourcefulness. In the second part, well defined topics of the post socialist system 
associated with corporate management are identified, and a clearer explanation of these 
concepts is given. With the intention to expand further, the third part addresses the 
intricacy of these concepts in the context of developed economies (Soskice, 2000). The 
fourth part indicates clearly that there is a disparity between East and West, identifying 
the topics that have to be taken into consideration and examining how a solid corporate 
management can materialize. The final comments stress the significance of business 
administration in the light of further European integration and a political and economic 
equilibrium. 
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      An original theoretic perception is needed that can develop in a sequence of 
innovative conceptions based on the public debate of the late nineties. The convergence 
hypothesis stems from the Anglo-American practice of coordinating and regulating 
organizational operations, allegedly the model leading the international perspective, and 
therefore encouraging and motivating all advanced societies to shift toward this structure. 
There are two points specifically that favour this concept of conversion, firstly, 
disenchantment with state communist notions about political centralization, and secondly, 
dissatisfaction with the Japanese productivity and the Japanese practice, which have been 
extensively researched (Morck and Nakamura, 2000). Nevertheless, the perceptions of a 
mixed economy and the end of history instigated more extensive investigations applied to 
highly industrialized societies, and concentrated upon nationwide historically developed 
financial organizations (Berger and Dore, 1996). The results indicated definite 
countrywide trajectories on organizational change, with reference to internationalization, 
and displayed every developed and consistent nationwide network as being more 
advantageous than the others, still experiencing at the same time several difficulties, that 
combined, they caused opposing counteractions to the present day market from the large 
companies (Casper and Hancké, 1996; Soskice, 1994; Vitols et al. 1997). In fact, taking 
the last twenty years of international integration into consideration, we find out that 
academic discussion has not been concentrated upon a clarified comparison of conversion 
and divergency, but instead has been focused on a comprehensive examination about the 
development of nationwide networks in the context of increasing interdependency, we 
come across a concept like this in the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
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      An argument based on the path-dependency approach, tends to rely heavily on 
explanations oriented towards the past. However, I can basically accept that state politics 
and state history definitely play an important part in affecting how capitalist 
organizations grow increasingly integrated, and in fact this is how the path-dependency 
approach of capitalist organizations becomes manifest (Chavance and Labrousse, 1998; 
Chavance and Magnin, 2000). This usually applies to developed societies and, in this 
respect, is endorsed in the Varieties of Capitalism. The viewpoint is, nevertheless, that 
employing a similar path-dependency approach in East Europe may frequently be 
confusing, inasmuch as it can not solve the difficulties of substantial and elementary 
organizational transformation. There is no knowledge on how and to what degree 
successive governments have been capable of resolving or, in various stages, overcoming 
their difficulties. Rather, there is a tendency for simplistic post facto interpretations. And 
when we refer to developed nations, for instance France, which was not just capable of 
building but also overcoming a dirigiste government organization, the path-dependency 
perspective correspondingly is not very useful, because we have to go further than this to 
comprehend how a sequence of organizational changes, along with standard 
macroeconomic practices, paved the way for a change of position by the government 
favouring a firm-led corporate management, ultimately resulting in a substantial 
modification of the organizational background of French business administration 
(Hancké, 2000). 
      The last two decades developed in a completely dissimilar fashion in East and West 
Europe. Accordingly, there were discrepancies between nations in eastern and western 
Europe, still, with regard to management topics, the most remarkable inconsistency 
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between these nations was that in eastern Europe, not like in developed industrialized 
societies, the financial decline taking place during the early eighties was originally 
resisted, but later stimulated considerable organizational transformation. There was no 
nation that could meet the demand for large improvement without a considerable 
structural transformation. The important outcome of financial decline in eastern Europe 
was wasting the economic resources, inclusive of human resources, which eventually 
added to the disintegration of the structure. 
Until the symbolic collapse of the Berlin wall, with very few exceptions, the firms located 
between the Elbe and Kamchatka were not subject to any typical market pressures international 
or domestic, but this was precisely the pressure behind the necessary changes in western 
economies, even if governments tried to dampen or delay it (Federowicz, 2003). 
Since 1990, eastern Europe has become susceptible to these pressures, although to a 
different extent in different nations and industries. In fact, this accounts for the 
discrepancies between the countries, though in a way, eastern companies found 
themselves under the circumstances of internationalized markets immediately, whereas 
western firms had experienced incremental adjustments with regard to 
internationalization, partially generated by the advantage of prosperousness in the sixties. 
During the same period, in eastern Europe, the revenues of premature financial success 
were mostly wasted in attempting to recover the expenses incurred by the propagation of 
one party economic and social control. 
      As a matter of fact even in developed and industrialized societies the concept of 
corporate management can not entirely be supported by the relationship between 
shareholders and top-level directors. At all events, this is not the manner to comprehend 
the corporate management issue, and definitely not the most practical in a comparative 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
42 
analysis. An analytical framework is needed with the potential to display the relationship 
between owners and managers and make sense of its determinants which stem from 
different areas of organizational environments. A method like this helps us to understand 
how corporate management truly functions, and more significantly, observe the 
organizational changes that paved the way for the formation of corporate management 
leading the national perspective in different nations, and also helps us to perceive the 
meaning of the various dynamics of transformation. What is lacking in the post-socialist 
societies is this kind of coordination and consistency between corporate management 
organizations on the one hand, and the policies for decision making and quality control. 
      To analyze the intricacy of management mechanisms at the company level, it is 
helpful to put into practice the well known comparison between two enduring and 
established models, the Anglo-American and the German. In defiance of the demands for 
adaptation, the two models hold on to their conflicting properties, with each one defined 
by the process of incremental adjustment, instead of an openness toward significantly 
innovative resolutions (Casper, 1999; Casper and Vitols, 1997). The discrepancies help 
us to identify the fundamental characteristics which play a part in business administration 
at the moment. Expressing the same thing differently, the conflict between the two 
models of business administration makes provisions for the construction of an analytical 
tool for cross national comparisons which essentially diverge from the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance. 
      For instance, with regard to Germany or Japan, we discover that financial markets are 
distinct from those found in the United Kingdom or the United States of America. Some 
scholars have argued about the pros and cons of bank-based structures against market-
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based structures (Levine, 1999). The discussion is basically concentrated on four nations. 
In bank based economies like Germany and Japan, banking corporations have an 
important part in the mobilization of funds, the allocation of resources, the provision of 
financial derivatives, and the process of investing. In market based economies like the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America, it is the stock exchange that has a 
significant part in mobilizing funds, allocating resources, and overseeing the investment. 
Analysts are divided between those who believe in the efficiency of markets, and those 
who believe the opposite. This gives rise to our main argument, the network of corporate 
management interrelates with the stock markets, the modernization policies put into 
effect, as well as the financial activities in different nations. Similarly, the network of 
corporate management interrelates with other important ingredients of developed 
capitalist structures, in specific, the legislation about the industrial relations, learning and 
training, especially vocational training at work, and the variety of the operations 
performed by firms and organizations, like technological development and quality 
control. With regard to the network of corporate management, there is no doubt that this 
explanation is currently starting to change, a point of view that becomes even clearer if 
we review developments. 
In the last twenty years, economists have evolved the corporate governance issue in ways that 
view it centrally as a problem between owners of companies, or between those people providing 
financial resources to companies and, on the other hand, the top managers of those companies 
(Federowicz, 2003). 
In a structure like this, the corporate management topic has become well known as the 
principal agency approach. In such a scenario, shareholders have clear objectives they 
want the board of directors to accomplish, and from the shareholders’ point of view, 
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corporate management must advance this authority over what top-level directors can 
determine. This presents, in a greater or less degree, the approach made by experts, or the 
manner they have approached this issue quite recently. 
      The extent of the research on the economy of Japan diminished the leading Anglo-
American perspective on the intellectual market for institutions and paved the way for 
continental orientated studies. The procedure of growing European integration, during the 
early nineties and mid nineties, strengthened the conception of a European business 
administration and assisted the development of a continental Rhenish corporate 
management, in opposition to the Anglo-American model. Nevertheless, the notion of the 
Rhenish variant was based on the German environment, and directed attention to other 
continental nations somewhat rarely, as a consequence demonstrating less the real nature 
of the European continent, and more the urge for a united Europe. In reality, every single 
nation pursued organizational transformation in a distinct manner, attempting to merge its 
organizational structure with some innovative designs, and becoming more responsive to 
the strains of internationalization rather than working for a European organizational 
environment. There are obviously a number of organizational frameworks found in the 
corporate governance of the European countries to anticipate an even coordination. 
      With regard to corporate management, the opposed principles of capitalist growth are 
first, the Anglo-Saxon model, closer to a free market idea but not equal to it, the 
shareholders are scattered throughout the organizational expansion but directors are 
consolidated and focused as well as exposed to a competitive environment, and second 
the German or Japanese model of capitalist growth, less oriented to a free market idea yet 
also subjected to a market type competition, the shareholders are consolidated and 
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focused as well as organizationally interrelated with institutional investors, whereas 
directors are less focused and have more liabilities toward financiers and staff members. 
      A major difference of liberal and coordinated markets is the character of decision 
making, whether it allows management to dominate the organizational operations of the 
firm, or it is based upon Mitbestimmung, or codetermination, with management and 
workers running the firm in the context of a consensus oriented decision making 
organizational environment.  However, decision making does not apply only to 
management and workers, it applies as well to the relationship between owners and 
management. A consensus-oriented economic landscape that is broadly defined as 
codetermination between owners, management, and workers is typical of the Rhenish 
variant of business administration, on the other hand an organizational framework with 
proprietors, and stockholders, who are not accountable to chief executives, is 
characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. The discrepancies and 
irregularities in the independence of decision making, the dependence on shareholders, 
and the mechanisms of power relations define the two models.           
      Observing the organizational dynamics of emerging structures, we can make 
reference to the theory of low level equilibrium, as defined by scholars, for Eastern 
European nations following the years of socialist control (Greskovits, 1998). This 
argument focuses on the relations between the economic structure and the social structure 
of those nations, and considers the existing problems with respect to their ability to 
reinforce democracy, and their influence on the important economic modifications, that 
presumably culminate in substantial social unrest. However, the unrest has not developed 
to a degree that might have jeopardized the success of the modifications. As stated by the 
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low level equilibrium theory, those nations have already succeeded in building popular 
egalitarian organizations and the basics of market relations, even though they are 
somewhat substandard and relatively immature. As a consequence, the low level or low 
quality equilibrium of the structure is quite steady as well as enduring. 
      There is not actually a market for institutions, market forces can not exactly 
determine what the corporate management environment in a certain country is, and when 
they occasionally do, this is not necessarily the right decision. The best structures, in a 
given period for certain product markets, are not inevitably found in regions or districts 
with the highest demands. The best structures interchange and, at the organizational level, 
there is no durable selecting mechanism. Because of this, the historically formed national 
economic environment has an important part in a government’s flexibility, and, with it, 
makes a contribution to shaping enduring, capitalist, organizational transformation. 
However, the long term financial robustness of a nation may have a significant impact on 
this procedure, and stems to certain extent from its global standing, as well as from its 
social and cultural status at international level. 
      This part discussed a theoretic perception for an international comparison of business 
administration. Even though the discipline of corporate governance is extensively 
researched, the analysis focuses on developed societies and the differences between them, 
and some times tries to extend an identical theoretic perception to other nations. 
Nevertheless, the evolution of a solid business administration in catching-up societies like 
the former GDR is influenced by political reforms. Resistance to change that exists in the 
process of organizational transformation, impairs the development of corporate 
management in those nations. The argument is that the study of business administration 
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in an East-West comparative analysis should also incorporate a broader debate on the 
economic and social character of agreements both official and unofficial. This discussion 
also explored the relevance of path-dependency. It supplemented the approach of 
Varieties of Capitalism with some concepts which make it more appropriate for an East-
West comparison.       
 
Collective Bargaining and Incremental Adjustment 
 
      In this section I will put forward for consideration another explanation of the German 
model, which draws from studies of the performance of large German firms since the late 
eighties (Rehder, 2001). I would like to set forth three major arguments, which constitute 
the rest of this section. In my first argument, I suggest that, because of the rules of 
collective bargaining in Germany, it is advantageous for large firms to preserve 
centralized organizational structures. In specific, big companies have a vested interest in 
preserving the peace-keeping role of centralized sector-level arrangements. As a 
consequence, my investigation concentrates on the part of large firms in the continuous 
evolution of the German collective bargaining organizations. 
      As opposed to abandoning the model, and this is my second major argument, large 
firms have actually been capable of attaining a substantial amount of resilience and 
versatility within the industrial relations structure since the mid-nineties. Big companies 
have tactically been capable of increasing effectiveness and productivity in relation to 
their costs. This has added to the lasting stability of the official institutions as the 
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augmented cost-effectiveness has restrained the workers from abandoning the centralized 
organizational structure. 
      However, this does not entail there have been no changes. In my third argument I 
give an account of the statutory amendments which developed in collective bargaining as 
an alternative to straightforward disintegration. In this case I suggest that the balance of 
collective bargaining has moved from making provisions for standard rules focusing on 
egalitarian relationships between large and small firms to the promotion of resilience and 
versatility that focuses upon ensuring the maintenance of entrepreneurial functions in 
uncertain circumstances. That procedure has signaled a revision of the correlation 
between productivity and the industrial relations system. The effectiveness of diversified 
quality production was initially founded on the manufacturing sector that provided large 
earnings and equal rights and opportunities. Nevertheless, that process culminated in a 
rearrangement of this correlation as the collective bargaining system had to be adapted to 
the requirements of production. 
      One important consequence of a centralized collective bargaining structure is its 
peace-keeping function. By switching the controversy in decision making between 
managers and employees to labour institutions outside the organization, managers in 
particular achieve a larger degree of peace-keeping inside the organization. 
Bargaining rounds take place between employers’ associations and trade unions. Employers can 
maintain a good relationship with their workforce by staying removed from the process. 
Moreover, by being members of a bigger association, employers are not as easily singled out for 
trade union activity and industrial action. Lastly, in many European countries, the employers’ 
associations even provide an insurance against losses in an industrial dispute by maintaining 
strike funds (Hassel and Rehder, 2001). 
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Centralized collective bargaining structures are particularly advantageous for managers 
provided that labour institutions are capable of introducing a state of opposition in 
decision making. When employees can disturb the composure of the firm in retaining 
workplace stability, managers have a vested interest in sustaining a central system. 
      Note the use of the term wage bargaining centralization. Some of the political 
economy literature distinguishes between centralized bargaining systems at the national 
level and intermediate bargaining systems at the sectoral level (Iversen, 1999). In our 
understanding, a centralized wage bargaining system is defined here as any bargaining 
level above the level of the firm. 
      For managers centralized collective bargaining structures can also be a disadvantage. 
The important consequence is that centralized collective arrangements limit the range of 
regional versatility. All settlements reached at the central level have to include a large 
number of diverse businesses. For that reason sometimes managers have to take measures 
with regard to remuneration and work time that do not always serve their personal 
interests or their own companies. They diverge from wage patterns to a small extent, and 
often have to add optional bonus schemes. Managers would have otherwise been capable 
of negotiating more suitable pay schemes and working hours at company level. 
Centralized collective arrangements may as well involve measures in relation to human 
resource management issues which might not have been taken at the firm level. They also 
prevent any rapid fluctuations in pay schemes and other amendments. As a result they 
hold back and impede certain industrial policies that managers may have implemented. 
      Nevertheless, large companies in Germany did not attempt to demolish the 
centralized collective bargaining structure as a means of counteracting or removing its 
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undesirable consequences. Instead, they resorted to firm-level bargaining for a solution. 
Bargaining at the firm-level has been quite prominent in the employment relations of 
Germany for a while now. Managers were favourably disposed towards cooperation as a 
component part of the corporate governance model in Germany, as it helps them to 
maintain workplace stability and coherence by incorporating the workers into the 
decision making procedure (Kommision Mitbestimmung, 1998). 
      Founded upon the persistent elaboration of expert knowledge, job coordination, and 
research and development, diversified quality production is helped by cooperation as it 
assists the integration of workers into plant-level alliances, and institutional change, 
which is debated with works councillors, adjusted by company-level pacts and put into 
effect simply and rapidly. What is more, firm specific collective bargaining has also 
brought forward a new trend in remuneration that makes provisions for a higher level of 
wages (Hassel, 1999). Centralized arrangements disregard the large dissimilarities 
between companies which provide different wage systems. Large firms can bargain with 
the works councillors payments above the going rate and they can also offer extra 
bonuses to attract skilled workers. 
      In an effort to determine the significance of company level agreements, I enquired 
into the emergence of these pacts in some of the largest firms in Germany during the 
nineties. In the nineties, most of the corporations bargained a plant-level agreement. 
These firms employed more than 4 million workers. About half of these workers were 
affected by the pacts. 156 plant level agreements were made in 55 corporations. 
(Monopolkommission, 1998).   
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      When negotiating over company level agreements, a number of managers’ interests 
can be identified, to exercise power over labour expenses, to maximize efficiency by 
enhancing the resilience of the manufacturing procedure, and to reassign responsibilities 
between the workers which is the basis of versatility. Table 8 indicates the three distinct 
kinds of arrangements. 
 
Table 8: Types of Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness in Big German Companies 
 
 Work redistribution pact 
 
Labour cost-cutting pact Productivity Pact 
Frequency 23 
 
29 27 
Employee concessions Reduction of working 
hours 
Reduction of the wage 
drift 
Additional working 
hours 
 Labour mobility Retrenchment of 
bonuses and premiums 
Measures against 
absenteeism 
  Paying below collective 
agreement standards 
Reorganization of work 
   Modification of 
payment schemes 
Employer concessions 
 
Employment security Employment security Investment and 
production 
 Vocational training 
 
Investment and 
production 
 
 
Source: MPIfG, 2001. 
      The strong participation of works councillors and trade unionists in decision-making 
can be interpreted by the characteristics of German business administration. German 
firms have always been identified by the strong participation of organized employees in 
decision making. In most enterprises, eighty per cent of works councillors are trade 
unionists, in several occasions they are even more. Besides, works councillors and trade 
unionists are usually involved in the executive committees of companies. In large firms 
which have company-level agreements, works councillors, trade unionists as well as 
employee delegates are in the supervisory boards of corporations. As a consequence, 
managers accept councillors and unionists as mediators in employment agreements. They 
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would rather incorporate them instead of endangering social harmony (Bronfebrenner, 
2000; Hassel and Rehder, 2001). 
      Intrinsic flexibility within the context of extrinsic inflexibility has customarily been 
the modus operandi of the employment relations in Germany. As I have indicated, 
bargaining versatility at the firm level and extensive regulation in collective arrangements 
have been distinctive characteristics of the workplace relations in Germany. Are the plant 
level agreements of the nineties, simply a continuation of the success of incremental 
adjustments to altering socioeconomic conditions? In this part, I will display that, in spite 
of the solidity of bargaining organizations, the capacity and authority to regularize 
working standards by collective arrangements has altered to an extent that indicates a 
more substantial modification of the German model. 
      The incremental adjustments of the nineties in Germany may be explained in a 
different way. The expansion of employment organizations from the west to the east in 
the aftermath of unification was the driving force toward the decentralization of the 
collective bargaining structure. Once employment organizations were expanded from the 
west to the east, the effect of higher wages was immediate. In the mid nineties, the 
alliance of several economic actors who had pressed for the expansion of western 
organizations disintegrated. The companies of the metal industry in eastern Germany 
which could not pay the higher salaries complained about the collective bargaining 
structure (Bispinck, 1993; Henneberger, 1993). The system was rescued by the initiation 
of hardship clauses into the collective bargaining structure. Firms could register for 
exclusion from the centralized arrangement and would be allowed this provided they met 
certain criteria. It was the only point since World War II, companies in Germany 
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constitutionally obliged to participate in a centralized arrangement were permitted to 
abstain from collective bargaining so as to survive. A study conducted by labour 
institutions found that 181 firms registered for hardship clauses in eastern Germany in the 
nineties (Bahnmüller and Bispinck, 1999). 
      The German model of centralized bargaining arrangements and company level 
settlements has changed. Firm-level agreements used to take place within a 
predetermined context. Organizations at the local or sectoral level used to decide on 
incremental adjustments at company level and determine the extent to which firm level 
actors were capable of taking their own decisions. Based on law, collective bargaining 
supersedes company-level arrangements. Firm level actors must have authorization to 
rearrange payment issues and work conditions at company level. When the centralized 
agreements do not incorporate this authorization or the possibility of decentralized 
bargaining to the firm-level, the company-level actors are constitutionally obliged to 
abstain from bargaining of those topics. 
The delegation of bargaining rights from the central to the plant level has been a process of 
enabling plant-level actors to deal with issues which were principally reserved for the 
associations. The associations took their right to restrict plant-level bargaining seriously and in 
particular trade unions tried to regulate as much as possible at the central level. Companies had 
to wait to be enabled by collective agreements to change practices at the plant level. (Hassel and 
Rehder, 2001).  
The firm level arrangements about employment in the nineties have in several occasions 
displaced the centralized agreements. Despite the fact that statutory provisions have not 
been modified and most arrangements do not breach the regulations, institutions have lost 
the ability to restrict company level agreements by implementing collective 
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arrangements. Even though firm level bargaining enforced centralized agreements, the 
arrangements of the 1990s demonstrated a tendency to regulate at the company level. The 
supremacy of centralized arrangements in relation to firm level pacts on important topics 
and practices has been overcome. 
      Whereas the advantages for maintaining a centralized collective bargaining structure 
outbalance the disadvantages for complete delegation, the alignment of the collective 
bargaining institutions in Germany to a globalized economy triggered a substantial 
modification of the industrial relations system. To a degree those adjustments sound like 
the term organized decentralization, the dual system that integrates central cooperation 
with features of delegation, as reported by scholars (Traxler, 1995). The notion of 
organized decentralization relates to a bargaining system in which bargaining tasks have 
been deliberately delegated to lower-level associations in a way that does not eliminate 
coordinating control by the higher-order associations over the bargaining process at lower 
levels (ibid. 1995). On account of their peace-keeping function, large firms have to 
pursue versatility and acknowledge the trade unionists’ part as a veto-player. Therefore 
the organizational structure is left solid. However, in spite of the organizational solidity 
we can also observe a procedure of organizational adjustment to a competition driven 
model of wage regulation that is based on the departure from collective bargaining 
agreements rather than  upon  their  practice.  Although  centralized  arrangements  at  the  
industry level make provisions for a comprehensive system of payments and work 
conditions, the rules and regulations for certain institutions and big companies may 
essentially differ with the requirements of production. Greatly versatile work time 
systems facilitate production to meet the demand without necessarily a rise in wages for 
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overtime. Formal centralized arrangements combined with firm-level pacts for 
competitiveness permit enterprises to adapt their wage patterns progressively to the 
business cycle. 
      The nationwide collective bargaining structure has customarily made provisions for 
higher incomes and a better work environment for white-collar and blue-collar workers 
and excluded low road strategies. It has also preserved peace keeping to a large extent. 
Furthermore, organizational provisions for vocational training, which were incorporated 
in the industrial relations of Germany for years, increased the dedication of workers and 
maximized production, both characteristics of a high road strategy (Streek, 1997). As a 
result, firms had to pursue a new approach. Diversified quality production has surfaced as 
a tactical response by companies to the restrictions of the inflexible external environment 
of remuneration, industrial cooperation and employment measures. Diversified quality 
production does not apply to the entrepreneurship of a particular firm but illustrates a 
certain kind of industrial policy. It relies upon a particular environment to make 
provisions for products and services that companies are not capable of producing on their 
own. For example, peace keeping is one of the common and unspecified redundant 
capacities that make the system function properly (ibid. 1997). Peace keeping at the firm 
level provides for first rate and large production, so that higher wages yield good results. 
      In this part I made another effort to add to the research on the process of 
organizational transformation through incremental adjustment, especially from a 
perspective that emphasizes on institutional evolution, as institutions designed with one 
set of goals in mind are turned to other ends (Thelen, 2003). In theory, institutions are 
usually defined as rigid, for the reason that most organizations take some time to become 
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efficient (Genschel, 1997). Consequently, organizational transformation which doesn’t 
happen through radical change is hard to define. Because the demand for adaptation to an 
international economy is high, institutions may have to change their activity whereas the 
organizational structure remains stable.   
 
The Restructuring of Labour Institutions 
 
      The presence of a solid, unified, efficient, and coordinated work force was an 
important determinant of the post-war prosperity of West Germany and its progress after 
the devastation caused to happen by the National Socialist Democratic Party towards 
democracy and political stability. However, a more careful analysis indicates that the 
West German variant, was also defined by a small number of labour institutions, and it 
was probably not as responsive to the needs and requirements of industrial unionism. In 
the fifties, there were divisions between the DGB labour institutions, and density ranged 
from 1,528,000 for IG Metall to 38,000 for Gewerkschaft Kunst (Streeck and Visser, 
1998). What is more, several labour institutions in the DGB were not industrial but 
occupational by definition, like the Gewerkshaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft or the IG 
Druck und Papier, which represented the professions of teaching and printing 
respectively. After a transitional period, the work force became strongly dedicated to 
democratization, and the urge for political reformation was determined by the need for 
economic, social, and industrial democracy. Consequently, Mitbestimmung, in other 
words cooperation between management and workers in decision-making was the 
permanent theme. The trade unions and the works councils were organized for action 
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against anti-democratic advancements. With regard to the constitutional system of 
government and the power of collective bargaining, unionists and councillors have 
contributed substantially to the employment relations of the Federal Republic, in other 
words an extensive network of establishments that resolves the disputes between 
managers and employees. The term German model first came to mean what it does today 
in the Federal Republic of Germany in the eighties (Dufour, 1998; Muller-Jentsch, 1995).   
The German model of industrial relations has been a source of resilience in the country, 
and an important determinant of its progress towards democracy. 
      More recently, strong tendencies of institutional change have become evident in most 
labour institutions. With reference to union revitalization strategies the conventional 
techniques are not adequate to organize and secure the services of the associates in the 
modern post-industrial economy. Members should not be considered as subservient 
associates but have to be regularly engaged in unions. Organizing has to be an all 
inclusive policy which enlists associates and persistently motivates existent unionists. 
This demands a complete institutional rearrangement. Trade unions need to become less 
centralized, and associates have to lay their hands on more tasks and responsibilities. It is 
necessary to educate organizers, and to allocate a greater quantity of economic assets to 
organizing. Additionally, trade unions must be considered less as aid suppliers and more 
as a political front that inspires associates to become motivated and sympathize with a 
common principle. Customary every day topics have to be integrated with principles of 
economic stability. Members should be conscious of belonging not just to an institution 
that bargains payments but moreover to a fellowship that stands for positive ideas. In 
America and Britain this is translated many times as an emphasis on militancy. 
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      In some occasions union mergers offered a good chance for internal restructuring and 
facilitated the decision-making procedure (Muller, 2001). As the analysis signifies, 
nevertheless, there is no customary model of union mergers and the result with regard to 
internal restructuring heavily relies on the main attributes of the trade unions engaged as 
well as on the kind of relationships between them. As table 9 suggests, union mergers are 
in essence a recent phenomenon. Although the amount of self-governed associates of the 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund continued to be unchanged at seventeen for the best part 
of the post-1945 era, this perseverance was succeeded by union mergers that reduced the 
amount of the associates to seven. 
Table 9: Union Mergers 
 
Union 
 
Merged With New Name Membership Year of Merger 
IG Druck und 
Papier 
Gewerkschaft 
Kunst 
IG Medien 175,044 1989 
IG BSE 
 
GGLF IG BAU 539,744 1995 
IG CPK 
 
IG Bergbau und 
Energie 
IG BCE 891,587 1997 
IG Metall 
 
GTB IG Metall 2,630,000 1999 
IG Metall 
 
Gewerkschaft Holz 
und Kunststoff 
IG Metall 2,763,485 2000 
Gewerkschaft 
Offenliche Dienste 
IG Medien Vereinigte 2,888,482 2000 
Transport und 
Verkehr 
DPG ver.di   
ÖTV 
 
HBV, DAG    
 
Source: IAB Bertriebspanel, 2002. 
      For many years sector wide collective bargaining has been a major characteristic of 
industrial relations in Germany. Strong labour institutions and comprehensive managers’ 
organizations bargained collective arrangements at nationwide or local level, and this 
way reduced the possibilities of controversy between firm-level administration and WCs. 
The robustness and cohesion of the main players, together with the reduced exercise of 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
59 
militancy, produced the foundations of social partnership. Over the past ten years, 
nevertheless, there has been increasing apprehension that this dual system may become 
eroded or substituted for something else (Hassel, 1999; Jacoby, 2000; Thelen, 2000). 
Though it is not well defined what this something else could be, there are indications that 
trade unions and works councils have to revise collective bargaining. There are other 
issues to be considered. For example, the increasing proportion of firms that decide not to 
participate in managers’ organizations and are not included in a sector wide collective 
agreement. In the late nineties 52% of firms in West Germany and 73% of firms in East 
Germany were not included in a sector wide collective agreement. Nevertheless, the firms 
in Germany that implement the regulations set by sector wide collective agreements 
employ the majority of the workers. 
Table 10: Collective Bargaining Coverage 
 
 West Germany  East Germany  
 Companies Employees Companies Employees 
Industry-wide 45% 65% 22% 46% 
Company-level 3% 8% 5% 11% 
Without 52% 27% 73% 43% 
 
Source: IAB Bertriebspanel, 2002. 
      German trade union federation strategies, nevertheless, seek to adapt the coverage of 
collective bargaining to the requirements of management and employees. Suchlike 
strategies aim at factions of employees which have not been the focus of attention before. 
They incorporate the latest bargaining issues that have attained significance on account of 
financial restructuring and the requirements of firms, or by reason of institutions 
attempting to recompense employees for losses not indemnified by the welfare state. 
Many of these original strategies were initially implemented at firm-level and it is still 
not clear whether their provisions can extend to the entire sector. There has been a 
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number of occasions recently where trade union and company-level administration in 
Volkswagen incorporated original clauses in a firm-level arrangement which were 
subsequently spread throughout the metal sector. In a way, Volkswagen is a laboratory 
for sector wide innovative agreements in the entire metal sector. Other examples are IG 
Metall, Debis, and ÖTV. 
      On the whole these laboratories of pioneering arrangements and brand-new agendas 
indicate that trade unions have the capacity to adapt their collective bargaining policy as 
well as tactics to the fluctuating demands of their members and to managers’ 
requirements for more versatility. In several cases trade unions expressed dissatisfaction 
at the low density of membership of female and white collar workers in their institutions, 
but now the IG Metall settlement, as well as Debis and ÖTV arrangements against 
income discrepancies, can make trade unions more appealing to these groups. In 
particular on topics like vocational training and research and development, there is a lot 
in common for collective agreements with management and managers’ organizations. 
There are, nevertheless, some reasons to be cautious. In case the supporters of a revised 
collective bargaining policy have to deal with some strong opposition inside their own 
institutions, arrangements like the ones settled by Volkswagen may be restricted. 
      Union mergers that occurred within the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund raise questions 
with reference to the character of the federation. Some scholars find it difficult to explain 
the role of a powerless and economically subordinate federation against a small number 
of labour institutions, notably IG Metall, which have the capacity to bargain 
independently with politicians, owners, and managers. (Behrens et al. 2002). However, 
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by bringing these innovative agreements into a formalized organizational framework, the 
Deutscher Gewerkshaftsbund can achieve a better position than before. 
      My argument is that institutions must encourage alliances with political fronts, to 
demonstrate and increase their socioeconomic influence on political factions, to devote 
more finances for strategic objectives, and to enlist possible organizers from a number of 
workplaces. This point defies the notion that institutions have to stick to their last and do 
not have to become comprehensive. Nevertheless, the hypothesis is that institutions in 
reality have to stick to their last when they encompass working lives inside and outside 
the factory or the office, for this is what trade unions and works councils have done ever 
since they were formed years ago. 
      Though internationalization has become a slogan in the ongoing academic discussion, 
labour institutions are interested in well defined issues of the procedure (Frege, 2005). 
There is no academic discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of internationalization 
like in America and Britain. Institutions in Germany are not against internationalization 
and they do not engage in anti-globalization demonstrations e.g. Seattle, Washington, 
Prague, Davos. Institutions are mainly concerned with global industrial relations and 
political provisions, both of which are associated with their specialized sections for 
economic policy. The requirements for political provisions in global industrial relations 
have been an issue since the seventies and are especially associated with the 
Gewerkschaft Textil und Bekleidung. Accordingly, the clothing and textile industry has 
formed a special relationship with establishments like the Kinderhilfswerk TDH and 
religious institutions in the developing countries.  
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      The promotion of alliances with political fronts is infrequent and irregular, and is not 
incorporated into a long term revitalization strategy. Fostering alliances is not 
coordinated. Many efforts are made at regional level and are contingent on the 
resourcefulness of unionists. An explanation for this cautious advancement may be that 
Germany has quite a reputation for influential societal factions in comparison with other 
developed nations (Kriesi, 1995). This can be difficult for trade unions and works 
councils because they have to strive for superiority with other actors. From another point 
of view, this contest makes it even more important for labour institutions to collaborate 
with political fronts, to be receptive to social factions that influence the workplace, and to 
develop the activities of their members. 
      The social dialogue was brought in by the EEC treaty of the late eighties as an 
instrument to inspire actors to promote contractual relations. It has been employed 
occasionally and up to this point, the quantity of arrangements settled by mediation 
between   ETUC, UNICE, and CEEP for the workers has not been quite satisfactory 
(Kuhlmann, 1998). In recent times, nevertheless, there has been increased interest in the 
application of social dialogue in bargaining (Bansbach and Keller, 2000). However, the 
chances of the social dialogue evolving into a main instrument of inter regional 
institutional cooperation are small. In other words, the institutions have no means to force 
the managers to negotiate. ETUC has so far developed largely by borrowing resources 
from European institutions to gain legitimacy with its own national constituents and by 
using the openings provided by these European institutions to try to elicit changes in 
employer behaviours (Martin and Ross, 1999). This method can be employed at regional 
level as well. Only when the managers have a personal interest in industry regulation, like 
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in the case of appointed employees, they may become inclined to apply this method 
(Behrens et al. 2002; Sorries, 1997). 
      IG Metall is one of the trade unions in Germany that has made quite some progress 
towards the European integration of collective bargaining policies. IG BAU  introduced a 
research project about institutional coordination and a large number of industrial relations 
issues in the European Union, in the mid nineties (Lubanski, 2000). In the late nineties, 
there was an arrangement with the construction unions of Austria and Switzerland about 
transnational wage bargaining. This was succeeded later by another settlement with the 
labour institutions of Holland and Belgium that was to embody the Basic Declaration of 
Principles on Wage Bargaining in the European Building Industry of the Euro Tarifpolitic 
der Bau und Agrargewerkschaften. IG BCE has groped to regain the initiative by 
realizing the potential of reciprocal agreements in order to establish a solid mining and 
chemical union in Europe (Zagelmeyer, 2000). 
      The function of inter-regional trade union committees is not spectacular, but it is 
imperative for promoting the spirit of European integration. The establishment of these 
committees is a procedure that furthers the transnational collaboration and harmonization 
of industrial relations in the European Union. The role of inter-regional trade union 
committees is to resolve workplace and regional development issues. Topics like 
Mitbestimmung that is to say cooperation between management and workers in decision-
making, social security and environmental affairs are some examples. 
      Besides the well known difficulties of institutional change, I attribute particular 
significance to a couple of propositions for union revitalization which integrate different 
strategies. Institutions in Germany have to develop a tactical approach at the European 
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level and in many occasions concentrate upon shop-floor policies. With respect to the 
latter, success is contingent on enlisting members and educating organizers combined 
with organizational transformation and assigning authority to the local and workplace 
level. As managers introduce modifications in the workplace, trade unionists also have to 
reply with incremental adjustments which serve their own vested interests. Making the 
first move can reinforce employee power in the workplace and create a new landscape. 
      The aim of this section was two-dimensional. Firstly, I wanted to broadly discuss the 
reorganization of German labour institutions as it becomes manifest in a number of areas 
that appear to be the most important. E.g. organizing the unorganized, mergers and 
internal restructuring, social partnership, political action, coalition building, and cross-
border trade union collaboration. Secondly, I described some of the latest developments 
in these areas and I proposed union revitalization strategies, at the national and 
international level.    
 
The Reformation of Welfare Schemes 
 
      This part suggests that co-determination and shareholder value are incompatible by 
definition, for the reason that the empowered employees enter into a state of opposition 
with stockholders. However, if the restructuring of corporate governance, through early 
retirement or voluntary redundancy is facilitated by a prosperous social security system, 
co-determination and shareholder value become complementary by the embodiment of 
one more institution in workplace relations, and that is the Welfare State (Boyer, 2005). 
Incidentally, a threefold compatibility like this was evident during the golden age of 
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workplace relations in Germany even though the context was not the same, the patient 
capital provided by banking corporations was compatible with the empowerment of 
employees at the company level, through co-determination and works councillors, and at 
the national level, by centralized bargaining. Such an institutional complementarity 
confirms the role of the welfare state as a facilitator of corporate restructuring and is 
displayed by chart 3. 
Chart 3: The Catalytic Role of a Third Institution 
 
Source: PSE, 2005. 
     In fact, it may be difficult to demonstrate that the coexistence of shareholder value and 
codetermination in Germany is because of the ambitious welfare state, this 
complementarity among several institutions and not only two, may be verified only by 
the construction of a model or by econometrics (Ernst, 2001; Milgrom and Roberts, 
Welfare State
Shareholder 
Value
Codetermination
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1990). It might not be as easy to critically analyze such an uncertain set of circumstances. 
As a result this theoretical explanation provides for a hypothesis instead of a conclusion, 
but it draws attention to a different concept in the debate on the industrial relations of 
Germany. The evolution of corporate governance and industrial relations should not be 
disengaged from the reformation of welfare schemes.         
      In the political economy of the welfare state some influential doctrines emerged 
which were capable of explaining the paradox of welfare state flexibility in times of 
economic and social constraints and despite the difficulties of fundamendalist parliaments 
(Pierson, 1996; Pierson and Weaver, 1993; Weaver, 1998). Those doctrines have been 
practically confirmed by the evolution of welfare states during the late nineties, and they 
have been able to account for the magnitude of diversification observed by the recent 
developments in welfare states. However, because they are not capable of explaining the 
paradox of organizational path departure, this section attempts to revise the latest theories 
of welfare states. I will review the latest theories, compare them with the reformation of 
the welfare system in Germany, and attempt to revise them. Looking into the topic of 
principal organizational transformation in the German welfare state, I follow the example 
of the deviant case study in comparative economics (Pierson, 1994). My research of the 
German welfare state has four purposes. Firstly, it attempts to bring forth ideas that 
capture principal reforms in welfare systems. Secondly, it identifies other trends which 
were formerly disregarded or ignored and makes propositions about the influence upon 
the procedure and the end results of welfare state reformation. Thirdly, it clarifies the 
theories which put together an essential supporting structure for the interpretation of the 
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welfare system reform. Lastly, it attempts to pay attention to the new events which must 
be interpreted by these theories. 
      There are a number of advantageous circumstances which support governments to 
suppress the opposition from the general public and to achieve success in carrying out 
incremental adjustments, firstly, policies to decrease, or avoid liability, secondly, 
appropriate organizational capabilities, and thirdly, an effective strategy implementation. 
The most significant blame avoiding strategy is probably the formation of a general 
agreement to spread liability (Weaver, 1986). To shift blame, it is important for 
governments to integrate leftist political factions and labour institutions into a 
reformation alliance, inasmuch as they are usually advocates of the welfare state. On the 
contrary, in parliaments where the opposition is not a supporter of the welfare state, the 
general public will probably not criticize the government for reductions in expenditure 
due to the fact that there are no other options (Kitschelt, 2001). Parliaments with 
centralized jurisdiction, like in the United Kingdom and the United States, come up 
against fewer obstacles in the process of making laws and are capable of carrying out 
incremental adjustments (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002). In many cases, 
nevertheless, the interrelation of governmental organizations with welfare state reforms is 
quite intricate and complicated (Hering, 2003; Bonoli, 2001). From another perspective, 
an effective strategy implementation that justifies the welfare system reform by 
incorporating popular beliefs facilitates parliaments to overcome the resistance from 
political factions (Schmidt, 2000). 
      For governments, the public and social cost of welfare state reforms was quite large 
in western Germany, but it was larger in eastern Germany. While in western Germany, 
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most people would be contented with the preservation of the existing state of affairs, 
about seventy five percent of the people in eastern Germany would rather political parties 
expanded the welfare system (Roller, 1999). In unified Germany, the public and social 
cost of welfare system reforms is quite large with regard to the privatization of 
governmental programmes. When people are questioned if they support national or 
private programmes for pensions and health services, the response is clear, sixty per cent 
of the population in western Germany and eighty per cent in eastern Germany support 
national programmes, only 20 and 10 percent, support private programmes (Kohl, 2002). 
What is more, unpublished material on social security indicates that people are 
favourably disposed towards state responsibility. A great number of people, both retired 
and employed, are in support of the maintenance of the present level of public benefits 
even if that demands an increase in social security contributions. 
      Many theories have been practically confirmed by the reformation of the welfare 
system in Germany during the eighties and especially during the nineties. In the eighties, 
the Social Democratic Party was included into an alliance to protect the welfare state. In 
the nineties, the Social Democratic Party strongly disputed the moderate reductions 
legislated by the political alliance of the Christian Democrats and Neo Liberals. 
Following the unsuccessful effort of Helmut Kohl to obtain the assistance of the Social 
Democratic Party for reductions in expenditure in 1997, the Social Democratic Party 
disagreed with the government, pledged to cancel those reductions in expenditure, 
attained a parliamentary majority in 1998, and carried out its pledge. Having said that, the 
reductions in expenditure put into effect by the government in 1999, caused great 
controversy in the Social Democratic Party, estranged sections of their voters, resulted in 
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the loss of the federal elections and the majority of the Social Democratic Party in the 
parliament, and caused great controversy among the labour institutions and the works 
councils. Consequently, in 2000 the new parliament introduced a gradual privatization of 
the German pension system. This legislation by the parliament controverts the latest 
doctrines of welfare state reforms about the function of the Social Democratic Party as a 
welfare state supporter over the last twenty years. 
      Some scholars have indicated that fluctuations in public opinion and personal interests 
with regard to the reformation results of the welfare system may as well be interpreted by 
the availability or insufficiency of an effective strategy implementation which authorizes 
unpopular amendments by appealing to common values (Hering, 2003). They have also 
indicated, nevertheless, that German parliaments up to now have not been successful in 
the implementation of an effective strategy to convince political factions about the 
indispensability of the welfare system reformation. Helmut Kohl’s neo-liberal 
internationalization strategy in the late-nineties damaged his reputation among interest 
groups and resulted in the loss of the federal elections (Kocher, 1998). Neue Mitte, 
another liberal strategy implementation by the German Social Democratic Party, has up 
to now been unsuccessful (Kocher, 2002). The table demonstrates that the German Social 
Democratic Party suffered the loss of the reputation that obtained in the elections by 
crusading against the government’s reductions in expenditure. The public opinion is that 
the major beneficiaries of the reformation in the late nineties were the government, the 
managers and the prosperous instead of the youngsters, the workers and the needy. 
Table 11: Who Benefits from the Government’s Reform Policies? (Responses in Percent) 
 
 CDU (1998) SPD (1998) SPD (2002) 
The State 57 38 50 
Employers 53 19 43 
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The Wealthy 45 14 39 
The Young 24 36 21 
Employees 10 42 12 
The Unemployed 7 35 7 
The Poor 6 33 6 
The Elderly 3 23 7 
 
Source: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 2003. 
 
      The urgency to shift blame and the necessity to obtain the support of labour 
institutions and interest groups essentially determines the reformation policies that 
parliaments use to carry out welfare system reforms. Scholars put forward an argument 
that the more obscure the changes and the longer the delay between when painful 
decisions are made and when they actually take effect, the better the chances the 
politicians will be able to avoid blame (Weaver, 1998). Other scholars argue that there is 
every reason to believe that policy makers will seek systematically to engineer changes 
that produce their major expenditure implications only at a later point in time (Pierson, 
2001). The argument of blame avoidance is for that reason capable of explaining firstly, 
why an increase in the age of retiring or social cutbacks, for instance, are postponed and 
last for a sufficient period of time. Secondly, it is able to explain why parliaments 
decrease the visible reform strategies and the immediate reductions (Hering, 2005). 
      The innovative privatized pension system that the German parliament initiated in 
2001 was devised as an inclusive and encompassing act against the reductions in 
expenditure and benefits. As the magnitude of the private pension system increases, the 
size of public pension benefits decreases. What is more, social security contributions will 
remain the same at around twenty per cent of gross earnings shared equally between 
employers and employees. The parliament’s initial programme was to make privatized 
pension systems compulsory, but this programme by Bundesrat was delayed by works 
councillors and opposed by trade unionists. Nevertheless, the 2002 welfare system 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
71 
reformation incorporates an act which demands to revise this option in a few years. 
Furthermore, privatized pension systems are partly compulsory due to the fact that the 
increase in privatized pension programmes virtually shrinks the magnitude of state 
pension systems. What is more, the parliament’s objective is to make sure that workers 
finish up with an amount of privatized pension benefits of around seventy per cent of 
their earnings, in other words an amount equal to that before pension privatization. 
      For some reason, the efforts to overcome the theoretical inconsistencies of welfare 
state reforms have up to now been insufficient. In the research on the comparative 
politics of the welfare system, there has been only one project by scholars on welfare 
reforms that had an overwhelming impact in consolidating and restructuring the powerful 
theories of the welfare system (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In this section, I will propose a 
new theory of incremental adjustment which is based on those powerful theories of the 
comparative politics of the welfare system, adds on Esping-Andersen’s research, and is 
therefore institution-centered. It is an interpretation of results which is capable of 
capturing path departure in the world of welfare capitalism and to differentiate this from 
path dependency. 
      My argument is that by examining the interrelation of a dual dynamic of institutional 
interference and creative opportunism, we can interpret the results of the welfare state 
reformation. The privatized pension system in Germany was defined by a mutual 
overruling of reformation barriers. Firstly, the minister of finance, having the support of 
other international financial organizations, overruled an objection by Gerhard Schroeder 
and the minister of employment about the government’s reductions in expenditure. 
Secondly, Gerhard Schroeder and the minister of employment overruled an objection by 
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the minister of finance to make provisions for the initiation of the privatized pension 
system. I identify this dual dynamic as institutional interference and creative opportunism 
using an idea by scholars’ research on organizational evolution and their account of the 
messy logic of organizational transformation (Offe, 2001; Orren and Skowronek, 1994). 
Institutional interference and creative opportunism is a dual dynamic which supplements 
the theories developed in the current literature. The emergence, and ongoing evolution, of 
financial affairs at the EU level offers a good example of the impact of the mechanism of 
institutional interference on the welfare system reformation. The German chancellor and 
the minister of employment, who was the head of the Christian Democratic Union for a 
long time, are good examples of creative opportunism. The ideals and activities of those 
two members of parliament had a great effect on the German welfare state during the 
period of organizational path departure. 
      Another argument is that European organizations exert an influence on the welfare 
system of Germany and are much more important than simply an actor which secures 
economic aid from international sources. Identifying financial organizations with 
economic constraints misinterprets the character of organizations and underrates their 
influence. Primarily, organizations have positive as well as negative characteristics (Offe, 
2001). European organizations are not all about fiscal pressures. They have objectives, 
and also comprehensive schedules. They make provisions for politicians with common 
values to use as resources. Those positive characteristics of institutionalized activities are 
also of a growing significance for the European organizations. It started as an 
arrangement of financial convergency criteria with no immediate effect on the German 
welfare state but grew into a comprehensive schedule with many objectives which entail 
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welfare system reforms. It was a few years ago that financial organizations elaborated on 
a comprehensive schedule for the reformation of welfare states. Those organizational 
objectives are frequently accepted and appropriated by finance as well as labour ministers 
at the national level (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2000). In spite of the presence of 
fiscal pressures, European organizations exert an influence at the national level. 
      I also argue that the politics of parliaments, as well as the new ideas and vested 
interests of actors such as works councils and labour institutions have an important part in 
the reformation of welfare states. They are capable of explaining the solidity of welfare 
systems in spite of institutional barriers. For instance, the solidity of the system in 
Germany till the early nineties can be interpreted by the general agreement between the 
managers, the employees, the works councils and the labour institutions (Nullmeier and 
Rub, 1993; Offe 1991). Economic and social reformation barriers were of secondary 
importance. The main reason why parliaments in Germany did not introduce elementary 
modifications was their unreserved devotion in the maintenance of the welfare system. 
As scholars have rightly suggested in a research of smooth consolidation in Germany, the 
absence of open and polarized conflict was not only due to the tactics of its containment, 
the success of conflict containment must be partly explained by the fact that there was not 
much conflict potential to be contained in the first place (Offe, 1991). Others draw 
attention to the commonly held national values and conceptions of identity which 
prevented German parliaments from taking into consideration fundamental changes in the 
welfare system (Schmidt, 2002). 
      My suggestion is that we have to take some political dimensions into consideration so 
we can understand the blame avoidance and credit policy motives of German 
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governments. The importance of economic and social dimensions may be different 
between nations. Innovative cross-cutting dimensions are emerging. For instance, an 
innovative dimension emerged between the mid and late nineties which is now cutting 
across the German welfare system. The decrease and stability of social security 
contributions has offered a chance for the German parliament to avoid blame, as well as 
to implement its credit policy. The social and economic controversy during the nineties 
has generated a contribution resistance among the people in Germany which can be 
compared with the tax resistance in some European neo-liberal welfare systems. The 
manifestation of this cross-cutting dimension has resulted in a political compromise in the 
field of benefits. Reductions in expenditure are not popular among the people and they 
result in generating blame. But if reductions in expenditure result in lowering and 
stabilizing social security contributions, the outcomes of those cutbacks are popular. 
Consequently, parliaments may be inclined to give up blame avoidance strategies if the 
outcomes of the reductions offer a chance for credit claiming. 
      Another suggestion is that we have to take the ideals and values of labour institutions 
into consideration and draw attention to the powerful role of these organizations. 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie, was the trade union that built an 
innovative and all inclusive pension system. Due to a small amendment in the legislation 
by the German government, in response to a proposal by the social partners in the 
chemical industry, institutions were given financial motives to bargain with managers 
about welfare systems. Since Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie accepted 
to negotiate about welfare systems under the amended regulations, it comes as no surprise 
that its employees welcomed the plan for the privatization of pensions and health 
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services. IG Metall, the metal workers’ union, did not take the opportunity offered by the 
German parliament to bargain about welfare systems and vetoed the proposal for 
privatized pensions. Because of the much larger influence of IG Metall in Germany, 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund also rejected the government’s plan. One year later, 
however, both IG Metall and the union federation welcomed privatization. 
      Furthermore, German parliaments sometimes welcome an organizational change, but 
their own ideals and values makes it impossible to implement it. For many years, the 
department of employment in Germany had an instruction manual which defined the 
character of the welfare state. It was clear that a pay as you go system is not reversible 
once it has started. Such a conservative idea ruled over the German department of 
employment from the sixties to the nineties. Employment ministers in Germany did not 
think that an institutional change is viable, and utilized the PAYG system as an ideational 
weapon that opposed the supporters of capitalization in the Christian Democratic Union. 
However, the dominance of ideas and values is dependent on the competence of the 
contenders who advocate them or upon organizational socialization and support. The 
change of personnel in the department of employment since the late nineties elections 
brought politicians in influential posts who think that the remuneration difficulties can be 
resolved. To sum up the main points of this argument, when parliaments are firmly 
persuaded that funding systems can not be reversed, they will not make an effort, but 
when they are willing to introduce reforms, they may well have the capacity to resolve 
these matters.  
      I have illustrated that comparative politics need another model of cause and effect to 
interpret organizational transformation in welfare systems than it has so far been used to 
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justify the incremental adjustment of social security in relation to developments in the 
economic environment. I have proposed a couple of new theories which have to be 
included in the current debate, institutional interference and creative opportunism. Those 
two theories are capable of explaining the paradox of organizational path departure in the 
welfare system of Germany. They provide for an interpretation of new events that the 
latest theoretical components of institutional change can not explain, the ability to initiate 
things by the Social Democratic Party, the rejection of personal interests, the overthrow 
of old policies and parliament’s strategy of blame avoidance, the controversial, though 
effective reformation procedure and the role of European financial organizations. 
Institutional interference and creative opportunism serve as an explanation for the 
organizational transformation of the German welfare state and may be able to justify 
important reforms in welfare systems that will probably happen in the years to come. 
      However, the coalition government assembled by Christian Democrats and Social 
Democrats quite recently makes it uncertain whether more substantial reforms can be 
expected. The last parliamentary elections made it evident that there is no support for a 
policy of reformation as the Christian Democrats did not have a large enough number of 
votes for a more comprehensive strategy, while the Social Democrats, who experienced 
sharp divisions and a loss of reputation since the turn of the century, found themselves in 
almost a similar position but with a more social attitude. This indicates that there is no 
general agreement as regards the nature of industrial relations and social security reforms, 
and there are probably internal struggles in the two parties at the moment. Even though 
the coalition government does not have to fear opposition from other major parties, its 
reformation policy is best defined by the well known uncertainty about corporate 
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governance, industrial relations, and the welfare state. The two parties are aware that 
more cruel reforms will not be tolerated by the people (Eichhorst and Kaiser, 2006). 
Therefore, the coalition government persists in the policy of incremental adjustment 
without radical reforms. Nevertheless, future reform announcements are more social 
democratic than they used to be under the Schröder administration. The announced 
reforms include the rise of tax share in welfare funding which comes from the rise in 
Value Added Tax.  In exchange, social security contributions will become less. 
 
A Comparative Advantage of Skill Profiles 
 
      This section expands on the concepts of institutional complementarities and varieties 
of capitalism by demonstrating the influence of operational management on the welfare 
state. The explanation for this organizational compatibility is investment in human 
resources. To express the same thing differently, different aspects of the welfare state fit 
together and fit with different aspects of the production regimes, in particular their labour 
market components and this fit is not a one-to-one correspondence between a whole 
configuration of welfare state and production regimes (Huber and Stephens, 1999). 
      Besides, distinct organizational structures form the institutional environment for 
distinct productivity policies, and there is not, generally speaking, a more effective 
business system in comparison with others, when the degree of state interference differs, 
the capitalist mode also differs. Different institutional conditions may give rise to 
different production patterns that may respect functionally alternatives, and sometimes 
functionally equivalents, responses to common economic challenges (Mocetti, 2004; 
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Streek, 1992). That’s in contrast with the hypothesis of best practice in the long period. 
All these concepts shall become clearer in the next pages. I speak of the theory of 
comparative advantage which defines that distinct productivity policies are strategically 
complementary with distinct organizational frameworks, and this can result in a more 
efficient economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Piore and Sabel, 1984).  
Chart 4: Another Triadic Complementarity 
 
Source: University of Bologna, 2004. 
      This is the way the academic literature presents the various brands of capitalism. 
Today’s comparative political economy is marked by other juxtapositions of polar 
models, fordist vs. specialized production, Anglo-Saxon vs. Rhenish capitalism, 
deregulated vs. institutionalized political economies (Albert, 1991; Crouch, 1993). In 
coordinated market economies like Germany, companies are dependent on non market 
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relations to correlate with intermediaries and to develop their own competence. The 
monetary policy is founded on a long term programme, this approach of patient capital 
makes provisions for companies to secure the services of high skill workers as well as to 
finance business activities which are profitable in the long term. In this system there is a 
more developed network of relation between investors, suppliers, customers, and through 
this way funding does not depend on quarterly balances, they are able to obtain 
information about the firms, to monitor the production activity and, eventually, to 
sanction it. The information flow is sustained by the internal structure of the firms which 
favours consensus decision-making. Rarely, in fact, the managers have the capacity of 
unilateral actions as happens in Anglo-Saxon economies (Mocetti, 2004). The 
productivity policy is based on a continuous procedure of skill learning, and the 
diversification of product quality. Nevertheless, firms that select such policies are 
exposed to the hold up problem by the workers and the poaching of high skill employees 
by competitors. The means of solving this difficulty is a policy which harmonizes wage 
systems all across an industrial sector, that is coordinate bargaining which acts as a 
defense mechanism for companies against the departure of employees and ensures that 
workers receive the maximum payment in exchange for the services they provide. What 
complements this organizational structure, at firm level, is a comprehensive network of 
works councils comprised of authorized employees, often trade unionists themselves, 
with substantial powers on the shopfloor. The works councillors provide for workers to 
resist lay offs or disadvantageous policies at the workplace, and they support them to 
invest in company specific vocational training. A wide ranging state supported vocational 
system also makes provisions for a large number of skilled employees. 
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      In liberal market economies like Britain, companies synchronize their operations 
basically through free market arrangements. The monetary policy is sensitive to short 
term profits. Several tasks and responsibilities are performed by only one party and that is 
usually the managers. Until very recently companies were not obliged to recognize 
employee representation through works councillors and trade unions are still thought as 
enfeebled. The existence of a competitive labour market also affects the policies adopted 
by employers and employees. This liberal economic environment makes it easier for 
corporations to employ or dismiss workers so as to profit from a favourable occasion but 
makes it more difficult for them to adopt a productivity strategy founded on a long term 
programme. They support employees to learn generalized skills that can be transferred 
between corporations instead of company specific skills or careers which embody 
vocational training in a working environment (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; Boyer and 
Hollingsworth, 1997). From another perspective, France with its dense regional network 
and flexible specialization diverts from the economy in northern and southern France. To 
juxtapose coordinated and uncoordinated market economies is not to deny that we find 
substantial variations between continental European, Scandinavian and Mediterranean 
coordinated economies, and it is certainly possible to discern some difference among 
Anglo-Saxon market economies. 
      According to the literature, social protection is considered as the principal institution 
in the construction of different models of post-war capitalism, and discrepancies and 
irregularities between welfare regimes are ascribed to dissimilar methods of government 
interference (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The concept of regime underlines that the welfare 
states are not simply an aggregation of distinct social programmes, to talk of a regime is 
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to denote the fact that in the relation between state and economy, a complex of legal and 
organizational features are systematically interwoven (Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
      Although social protection has been criticized by neoliberals, and was held 
responsible for diminishing returns, for decreasing employee motivation and for the 
careless management of financial resources, an ideology, in brief, which helps greater 
income equality but at the same time hinders the development of the economy, here we 
emphasize on the beneficial effect of the welfare state (Atkinson, 1996). Redistribution 
politics are imagined as a holed bucket, income is transported from the richer to the 
poorer in a holed bucket and part of that will be lost during the journey (Okun, 1975). 
Economists didn’t have, always, the same vision of the welfare state but the changed 
political climate implies that sympathetic economists get higher rewards than critical 
ones. In Germany temporary jobs were introduced since 1985, but successive legislative 
acts has put narrower constraints to duration and renewal of such contracts, in France use 
of atypical contracts was liberalized in 1985, but in 1990 a new legislative act has 
restricted the use and increased the costs (Mocetti, 2002). 
      Distinct organizational structures cause a comparative advantage for distinct 
production regimes. In agreement with this, organizational change in social protection 
challenges the thesis of convergence as regulations are formed according to the path-
dependency of nations. A good example is the procedure of regulation of industrial 
relations, in Europe the divergences persist not only as a result of institutional 
infrastructures which come from the past but even because correspond to different 
strategies of the economic agents (Regini, 2002). In spite of similar pressures faced by 
every country, the responses to these pressures are quite dissimilar. There is a general 
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trend for making workplace relations systems more flexible but there are also different 
production models and welfare states. This partially confirms the interdependence of 
social protection systems and productivity policies. 
      Skill profiles are hard to measure as they can not be observed. Nevertheless, some 
reliable indexes can be used for this purpose. They include the indicators for individual 
dissmissals, temporary employment, collective dismissals, social spending, 
unemployment protection, average length of tenure, share of specific training in the 
national training system, subjective perception of the workers about transferability of 
their skills, deferred wage schemes, level of educational scholastic human capital, level 
of professional human capital, skilled workers as percentage of total workforce, and share 
of formal training in the national training system. The final index is calculated as a 
weighted average of previous indicators after each indicator has been standardized to 
vary between 0 and 1. Firstly, we have to refrain from generalizations which are usually 
found in the research of human resources. Social protection is not considered as a 
combination of education and experience, or the volume of certificates relevant to the 
population. The attributes of skills obtained, the nature and the skillfulness of the 
vocational system are taken into consideration, the European Household Community 
Panel seems to be the right source. 
Table 12: The Numerical Indexes Obtained 
 
 Work Protection Social Protection Specific Skills Industrial Skills 
Germany  0,703 0,829 0,718 0,688 
Denmark 0,405 1,000 0,356 0,971 
Netherlands 0,595 0,779 0,405 0,782 
Belgium 0,676 0,767 0,574 0,595 
France 0,757 0,815 0,767 0,541 
United Kingdom 0,243 0,556 0,396 0,441 
Ireland 0,297 0,515 0,509 0,516 
Italy 0,919 0,571 0,829 0,446 
Greece 0,946 0,659 0,920 0,305 
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Spain 0,838 0,748 0,671 0,675 
Portugal 1,000 0,576 0,784 0,357 
Austria 0,622 0,731 0,582 0,578 
Finland 0,568 0,954 0,463 0,810 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2004. 
      The EHCP data clearly demonstrates that European coordinated economies like 
Germany and France are the most balanced with a high level of work and social 
protection as well as a high level of specific and industrial skills. Scandinavian 
coordinated economies are the countries with the highest level of social protection and 
industrial skills, but a low level of work protection and the lowest level of specific skills. 
Mediterranean coordinated economies are the countries with the highest level of work 
protection and specific skills, but an average level of social protection and the lowest 
level of industrial skills. Anglo-Saxon market economies like the United Kingdom have 
the lowest level of work and social protection, a low level of specific skills, and an 
average level of industrial skills. Most importantly, nations with high levels of work or 
social protection also demonstrate high levels of specific or industrial skills. To the extent 
that skillfulness is related to productivity the Eurostat evidence defies the argument that 
there is a big tradeoff between equality and efficiency. 
      The evolution of industrial relations theory, since the mid seventies, has made 
provisions for another argument which emphasizes on the effectiveness of national 
welfare states, by taking into consideration the production systems. The most important 
argument of all has been the concept of market imperfections because of specific assets 
and mental patterns. The relationship of employers and employees involves an 
investment in relationship specific resources which generates some sort of a dual 
monopoly, and as this particular exchange goes on, it also generates mutual gains in the 
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long term (Buechtemann and Walvei, 1999). Both empirical and theoretic approaches 
provide an interpretation why, from a microeconomic point, long term industrial relations 
are complementary with and, in several occasions, instrumental to, if not even a 
necessary prerequisite for efficiency. 
      We observe that a high level of employment legislation suggests a predominance of 
deferred wages, with a bonus that increases with job status. Deferred wages may be the 
reason for the increased commitment of the employee to the company that also increases 
the opportunity cost of the departure of an employee from the corporation, or a 
continuous training procedure with increased skillfulness, the wages, in this occasion, are 
another index of the value of the employee to the company. The point is that the 
resignation of workers is expensive for a corporation, and it would be more expensive 
when the managers have substantially invested in their training. 
      A premium that rises with job status may be the outcome of a policy, a sum withheld 
at the beginning and to be returned in the last period of the relationship, to safeguard the 
training investment of the manager (Freeman and Lazear, 1996). In the seventies, the 
Electronic Data System Corporation required the payment of $12,000 if the trained 
workers left the firm after three years from hiring. Some problems could arise if we 
consider cases of credit constrained (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). The work would be 
more precious for employees and the managers would depend on their commitment to the 
company. Normally, to agree with deferred wages, that is to be sure that they get the 
bonus that increases with job status, the employees must also have an external 
reassurance. 
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      A perception of the welfare state as a defense mechanism, and not just as an 
institution of equality and stability, helps us to identify another organizational 
compatibility, which is the relationship between employment legislation and production 
strategy. In times of rapid structural changes, of greater openness that disrupts established 
economic relations, the workforce will need insurance against a rainy day (Agell, 1999). 
It is widely accepted, in sociology, the general notion that reforms in production regimes 
cause and regularly affect, the attitudes of employees, in different manners. In agreement 
with the literature, the social policy preferences mainly depend on four variables, the 
level and the typology of skills acquired, the industry to which they belong, the 
production strategies of a country and the level of existing social assistance (Kramer et al. 
2000). Besides, the attitudes of workers may be the reason for differences in economic 
choices and labour institution and party requests (Manow, 2001). The desire for 
employment legislation is dependent on risk exposure, and this, in turn, is strongly related 
to the portability of skillfulness (Baldwin, 1992; Iversen and Soskice, 2001). As liquid 
skills are associated with specific skills, employees with specific assets are more probable 
to become long term unemployed in the instance of job loss and as a consequence are 
more likely to be supportive of social protection. Welfare states are considered, in this 
sense, as the result of a political choice, the outcome of a democratic procedure when 
employees can stand up for what they think as beneficial. This kind of analysis seems to 
be strongly related to the manufacturing sector but some preliminary analysis in these 
fields seems to confirm this analytical approach and to consent new and more particular 
considerations, sector by sector, which becomes a proposition for further study.         
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Conclusions 
 
      The adaptability of the German model of workplace relations demonstrates that 
industrial democracy which is held in high respect by some authors will probably not 
become obsolete in an international economy (Soskice, 1990). The social partnership, a 
main feature of this variety, particularly the dual dynamic of labour institutions and 
works councils, makes provisions for an alternative to the neoliberal policies, and a 
comparison can be made with other countries. Substantial liberalization of the Swedish 
economy had already started twenty years ago (Rothstein, 2002).  The resilience of the 
German model in contrast with the decorporitization of the Swedish model, apart from its 
ambitious welfare state, demonstrates that a decentralized version of a coordinated 
market economy is more appropriate in the context of global competition (Thelen, 1993; 
Turner, 1998). A more comprehensive examination of the Scandinavian society was 
beyond the scope of this chapter but the decentralization of the German variant was 
extensively discussed.  
      A major theme in the ongoing research of German industrial relations is the formation 
of new institutions and a schedule fulfillment pact for managers and workers 
(Heidenreich, 1992). This was an advantage for both sides, but with regard to politics the 
process was not as successful. It was also the reason for the disengagement of employees 
from the production line, although firms achieved flexibility on the part of employees. 
The politicization of workplace relations is often used by academics to interpret the 
organizational sclerosis of the firms and to serve as an explanation for the fact that the 
unofficial agreements integrated with the official structure but at the same time 
undermined it, and this is thought as one of the major characteristics of German labour 
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relations (ibid 1992). Consequently, the unofficial agreements which undermined the 
official structure also offered another option, but oddly enough the new framework 
became much more stable. 
      From a theoretical point of view, political consolidation in Germany has been 
practically achieved, while socioeconomic coherence has been put off. It is well defined 
that it was much easier to reform employment legislation in Germany than to introduce a 
socioeconomically coordinated structure (Hyman, 1996; Klikauer, 2002). Another 
obstacle in the reformation of industrial relations has been a recent decrease in the 
membership of labour institutions. Although the wage gap between western Germany and 
eastern Germany has been reduced because of the role of works councils, and new labour 
institutions have been founded, as the facts indicated, the discrepancies between eastern 
Germany and western Germany persist. Researchers have formerly ignored this in such a 
way that they have underestimated the role of the public sector in German industrial 
relations. 
      The economic and social progress of Germany was sustained by a comprehensive 
network of partnerships that incorporated major actors, such as banking corporations, 
works councils, and labour institutions. Notwithstanding that Germany was a western 
liberal society, it was also described by definitive terms such as bargained political 
economy or democratic corporatism because of the coordinated structure and the large 
number of collective arrangements (Katzenstein, 1985) Solid and integrated organizations 
of banking corporations and large firms were very important. Writers portrayed this 
design as a good example of a cooperative market economy with payment plans that help 
firms to sign long-term contracts, develop vocational training, and expand to diversified 
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industries, they were favourably disposed towards this political economy as opposed to 
the less efficient Anglo-Saxon version (Soskice, 1990; Turner, 1998). 
      In my first attempt to make a substantial contribution to the main part of 
investigation, I analyzed the determining factors of the power, modeling, and social 
structure theories. More studies are clearly needed to confirm these preliminary findings. 
In this analysis, power theories provided the most evident presumptions. In particular, 
works councils willingness to build close associations with managers was very clearly 
conditional upon works councils coordinative attitudes. From a different perspective, 
cooperative attitudes in employment relations were not influenced at all by institutional 
characteristics such as firm, sector, trade union and works council. Consequently, the 
relation of labour institutions with managers was to a large extent formal and not 
dependent on the personal characteristics of social partners. Nevertheless, this does not 
entail that coordination of the actors is clearly an inherent quality of the German model. 
To the contrary, cooperation is a constantly debated development of the dynamics of 
managers, works councils and trade unions. In the well organized structure of industrial 
relations in Germany, the collaboration of labour institutions and managers is contingent 
upon day-to-day relationships. This is also an important statement for the academic 
literature of workplace relations. It makes clear that although statutory support of 
democratic corporatism is necessary it is not adequate to secure a cooperative 
employment relationship. However, constitutional authority for labour institutions may 
be able to help in producing a different equilibrium of power which seems to be a 
precondition for collaboration. 
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      In another attempt to make a contribution to knowledge I also illustrated some 
notions about the transition of corporate governance in Germany. Generally speaking the 
ongoing developments may be defined as incremental adjustments in the German variant 
of the stakeholder society. The incremental adjustment has occurred in the field of 
institutions and of practice. In the field of institutions, ever since the political unification 
the coalition of stakeholders has not been replaced or hindered by small-scale investors. 
This stakeholder coalition has instead been reinforced by the inclusion of institutional 
investors into the social partnership. Therefore, I argued for the emergence of an 
augmented stakeholder alliance in Germany. In the field of practices, the well established 
goals that large companies have focused, have not been replaced by shareholder 
principles but have been reinforced by the stakeholder alliance. In contrast with the 
model of shareholder interests in the United States and the United Kingdom, the German 
model may be defined as bargained shareholder economy, which has two distinct 
attributes (Vitols, 2003). The employment of strategies designed to accomplish 
shareholder value to increase the profits of large companies must be discussed with the 
delegates of the stakeholder coalition, particularly the banking corporations and labour 
institutions. To keep in a state of balance in an augmented stakeholder coalition, 
strategies designed to accomplish shareholder principles are regularly adjusted in order to 
take into consideration the advantages for the economy and the society. A number of 
policies, such as remuneration incentives were initiated to align the interests of investors, 
managers, and employees, consequently Germany is distinct from the version of 
shareholder value in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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      To examine the complexity of corporate management at the firm level it was quite 
useful to investigate the well known controversy about long lasting and standardized 
models like the Anglo-Saxon and the German. In contrast to the requirements for 
transformation, the two versions stand firm in their individual qualities, and are both 
determined by the procedure of incremental adjustment, as opposed to a tendency for 
groundbreaking modifications (Casper, 1999; Casper and Vitols, 1997). The differences 
serve as an explanation for the factors that have a significant role in organizational 
change at present. In other words, the controversy about the two versions provided for the 
fundamental characteristics of the formation of an analytical mechanism for international 
trends which take a different course to the Anglo-Saxon version of corporate 
management. 
      Based on the continuous improvement of know how, work organization, and 
vocational training, diversified quality production policies are assisted by 
codetermination as it helps the assimilation of workers into factory level coalitions, and 
organizational changes, which are discussed with trade unionists, regulated by firm level 
arrangements and accomplished in a simple manner. In addition, negotiating at the 
company level has drawn attention to a recent tendency in wage systems which provides 
for a higher level of earnings (Hassel, 1999). Centralized settlements overlook the large 
differences of firms which offer various remuneration schemes. Big companies are able 
to negotiate with delegates of employees wages above the going rate and appropriate 
remuneration systems to bring in qualified staff. 
      In spite of the problems of organizational change, I attributed special importance to 
some concepts about the rearrangement of institutions that combine separate policies. 
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German unions need to elaborate on a strategic procedure at the European level and in 
some cases focus on workplace practices. With regard to the second, the revitalization of 
institutions depends upon the recruitment of associates and vocational training 
complemented with organizational reform and delegating power to the district level. As 
directors initiate changes at the shop floor level, workers will have to respond with 
incremental adjustments which are advantageous to employees. Groping to regain the 
initiative increases workers’ authority on the shop floor and forms new strategies. 
      With regard to the reformation of the welfare system, socioeconomic developments 
had to be considered to comprehend the strategies of blame avoiding and credit claiming 
by parliaments. The significance of some political advances can differ between the 
European nations. Innovative cross-cutting reforms are materializing. For example, an 
innovative socioeconomic dimension has become manifest for a few years now and is 
cutting across the European states. The reduction as well as stabilization of public benefit 
contributions has provided an opportunity for the German government to carry out its 
policy of credit claiming. The political controversy over the last ten years or so has 
recently brought about a contribution resistance in Germany that is on a par with the tax 
resistance in other countries of Europe. The emergence of this cross-cutting dimension 
has culminated in a substantial reformation of the German welfare system. Cutbacks in 
spending are not welcome by the employees and they culminate in public unrest. 
However, when cutbacks in spending are supplemented by a reduction and stabilization 
of public benefit contributions, the results are welcome. To sum up, parliaments are likely 
to abstain from blame avoiding when the results of low expenditure provide an 
opportunity for credit claiming. 
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      When these diverse interpretations are taken into consideration, a definite but general 
conclusion comes to light, the coordinated market economy in Germany has been 
adjusted and is heading toward an unparalleled hybridization, which bears only a slight 
resemblance to a liberal market economy.      
 
References 
 
Agell, J. 1999. On the Benefits from Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market Failures and  Social  Insurance. 
      Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Aguilera, R. and Jackson, G. 2003. The Cross-National  Diversity  of  Corporate  Governance:  Dimensions 
      and Determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28:3. 
Albert, M. 1991. Capitalisme Contre Capitalisme. Paris: Seouil Points. 
Atkinson, T. 1996. Incomes and the Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bahnmuller, R. and Bispinck, R. 1999. Tarifpolitic und Lohnbildung in Deutschland. Dusseldorf: WSI. 
Baldwin, P. 1992. The Politics of Social Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bansbach, M. and Keller, B, 2000. Social Dialogues: An Interim Report on Recent  Results  and  Prospects. 
      Industrial Relations Journal, 31:4. 
Barca, F. and Becht, M. 2001. The Control of Corporate Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bassett, P. 1986. Strike-Free: New Industrial Relations in Britain. London: Macmillan. 
Batstone, E. 1984. Working Order: Workplace Industrial Relations over two Decades. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Baylis, T. 1993. Transforming the East German Economy: Shock without Therapy. Ann  Arbor:  University 
      of Michigan Press. 
Behrens, M. Fichter, M. and Frege, C. 2002. Unions in Germany: Groping to Regain the Initiative. Geneva: 
      ILO. 
Berger, S. and Dore, R. 1996. National Diversity and  Global  Capitalism.  New  York:  Cornell  University 
      Press. 
Bispinck, R. 1993. Kampf Gegen die Tarifwende. Mitteilungen, 46:1. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
93 
Bispinck, R. 1991. Auf dem Weg zur Tarifunion. Mitteilungen, 44:1. 
Blau, P. 1974. Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley. 
BMAS, 1995. Mitbestimmung, Unternehmensmitbestimmung & Betriebsmitbestimmung. 
Bonoli, G. 2001. The Politics of Pension: Institutions and Policy Change  in  Western  Europe.  Cambridge: 
      Cambridge University Press. 
Boyer, R. 2005. What Future for Codetermination and Corporate Governance in Germany? Paris: PSE.  
Boyer,  R.  and  Hollingsworth,  J.  1997.  Contemporary  Capitalism:  The  Embeddedness  of  Institutions. 
      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bronfebrehner, K. 2000. Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility  on  Workers,  Wages  and  Union  
      Organizing. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Buechtemann, C.  and  Walwei,  U.  1999.  Employment  Security  Through  Dismissal  Protection:  Market 
      versus Policy Failures. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Bundesministerium  der   Finanzen    2000.    Finanzpolitische    Leitplanken:  Sieben  Wegweiser  für  eine 
      Zukunftsahige, Gerechte und Europataugliche Finanzpolitik.  
BusinessWeek, 2004. German Unions, Not Workers, are the Obstacle. 
Casper, S. 1999. National Institutional Frameworks and High-Technology Innovation in  Germany.  Berlin: 
      WZB. 
Casper, S. and Vitols, S. 1997. Corporate Governance in Large British  and  German  Companies.  London: 
      Anglo-American Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society. 
Casper, S. and  Hancké,  B.  1996.  How  Institutional  Quality  Standards  Support  Variety  of  Capitalism. 
      Berlin: WZB. 
Chavance, B. and Magnin,  E.  2000.  National  Trajectories  of  Post-Socialist  Transformation:  Is  there  a 
      Convergence Towards Western Capitalism? Paris: La Decouverte. 
Chavance, B. and Labrousse,  A.  1998.  Regulalation  Theory  and  Post-Socialist  Transformation.  Berlin: 
      WZB. 
Cioffi, W.  2000.  Governing   Globalization?   The   State,   Law   and   Structural   Change   in   Corporate 
      Governance. Journal of Law and Society, 27:4. 
Crouch, C. 1993. Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
94 
Csuhaj, V. and Hethy, L. 1990. Labour Relations in Hungary. Budapest: Institute of Labour Research. 
Dahne, M. 2001. East fears Exodus. Metall, 53:3. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003. Flow of Funds Accounts. 
Diewald, M. 1995. Lebensverlaufe in der DDR. Berlin: Academie Verlag. 
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. 1983. The  Iron  Cage  Revisited:  Institutional  Isomorphism  and  Collective 
      Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 27:1. 
Dufour, C. 1998. Modell Deutschland-Modell Europa. Opladen: Leske & Buderich. 
Eaton, J. 2000. Comparative Employment Relations. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Manow P. 2001. Comparing Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy and  Political  Economy 
      In Europe, Japan and the USA. London: Routledge. 
Eichhorst, W. and Kaiser, L. 2006. The German Labour Market: Still Adjusting Badly? Bonn: IZA. 
Eisen, A. 1996. Institutionenbildung in Ostdeutschland. Opladen: Leske & Buderich.  
Ernst, E. 2001. Complémentarités Institutionelles et Croissance Économique à Long Terme. Paris: EHESS. 
Esping-Andersen,  G.  1996.  Welfare  States  in  Transition:  National  Adaptions   in   Global   Economies. 
      London: Sage. 
Esping-Andersen, G. 1990.  The  Three  Worlds  of  Welfare  Capitalism.  Princeton:  Princeton  University 
      Press.  
Ettl,   W.   and   Heikenroth,   A.   1996.   Structurwandel,   Verbandsabstinenz,    Tarifflucht.    Industrielle 
      Beziehungen, 3:2. 
Fajertag, G. and Pochet, P. 1997. Social Pacts in Europe. Brussels: ETUI. 
Federowics, M. 2003. Bridging East  and  West:  Re-Examining  the  Notion  of  Corporate  Governance  in 
      Explaining Institutional Change. Berlin: WZB. 
Freeman, R. and Lazear, E. 1996. Relational  Investing:  The  Worker’s  Perspective.  Cambridge:  National 
      Bureau of Economic Research. 
Frege,  C.  2005.  Varieties  of  Industrial  Relations  Research:  Take-Over,  Convergence,  or  Divergence? 
      British Journal of Industrial Relations, 43:2. 
Frege, C.  2003.  Transforming  German  Workplace  Relations:  Quo  Vadis  Cooperation?  Economic  and 
      Industrial Democracy, 24:3. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
95 
Frege, C. 2002.  A  Critical  Assessment  of  the  Theoretical  and  Empirical  Research  on  German  Works 
      Councils. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40:2.  
Frege, C. 1999. Social Partnership at Work: Workplace  Relations  in  Post-Unification  Germany.  London: 
      Routledge. 
Frege, C. 1996. Union Membership in Post-Socialist East Germany: Who Participates in Collective Action? 
      British Journal of Industrial Relations, 34:3.  
Fritze, L. 1993. Innenasicht eines Ruins. Munich: Olzog Verlag. 
Genschel, P. 1997. The Dynamics of Inertia, Institutional Persistence, and Change  in  Telecommunications 
      and Health Care. Governance, 10:1.  
Gensior, 1992. Die Bedeutung von Gruppenstructuren und Sozialer Bindung. Bonn: Sigma. 
Geppert,  K.  Gornig,  M.  and  Werwatz,  A.  2006.  Agglomerations  and   Geographic   Concentration   of 
      Industries-Evidence for Germany. Berlin: Humboldt-Universität. 
Gold, C. 1986. Labour-Management Committees: Confrontation, Cooptation, or Cooperation?  New  York: 
      ILR Press. 
Gospel, H. and Pendleton, A.  2004.  Corporate  Governance  and  Labour  Management:  An  International 
      Comparison. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Goyer, M. 2002. The  Transformation  of  Corporate  Governance  in  France  and  Germany:  The  Role  of 
      Workplace Institutions. Cologne: MPIfG. 
Grabbe, H.  2000.  European  Integration  and  Corporate  Governance  in  Central  Europe:  Trajectories  of 
      Institutional Change. Berlin: WZB. 
Greskovits, B. 1998. The Political Economy  of  Protest  and  Patience:  East  Europe  and  Latin  American 
      Transformations Compared. Berlin: CEU Press. 
Hahlen, J, 2001. Life  and  Work  in  Germany:  Results  of  the  Micro-Census  2000.  Wiesbaden:  Federal 
      Bureau of Statistics. 
Hall, P. and  Soskice,  D.  2001.  Varieties  of  Capitalism:  The  Institutional  Foundations  of  Comparative 
      Advantage. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hancké, B. 2000. Corporate Governance in a Changing Political and Economic  Environment:  Trajectories 
      of Institutional Change on the European Continent. Berlin: WZB. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
96 
Hassel, A. and Rehder, B. 2001. Institutional Change in the German Wage Bargaining System: The Role of 
      Big Companies. Cologne: MPIfG. 
Hassel, A. 1999. The Erosion of Industrial Relations in Germany. British  Journal  of  Industrial  Relations, 
      37:1. 
Heering,  W.  and  Shroeder,  K.  1995.  Vom  Arbeitskollektiv  zur  Sozialpartnershaft.  Berlin:   Academie 
      Verlag. 
Heidenreich, M. 1992. Krisen, Kader, Kombinate. Bonn: Sigma. 
Henneberger, F.  1993.  Transferstart:  Organizationsdynamik  und  Strukturkonservatismus  Westdeutscher  
      Unternehmerverbände. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 34:1. 
Hering, M. 2005. Welfare Restructuring Without  Partisan  Cooperation:  The  Role  of  Party  Collusion  in 
      Blame Avoidance. Hamilton: SEDAP. 
Hering, M. 2003. The Politics of Institutional  Path-Departure:  A  Revised  Analytical  Framework  for  the 
      Reform of Welfare States. Mannheim: MZES. 
Hethy, L. 1994. New Frontiers in European  Industrial  Relations:  Tripartism  in  Eastern  Europe.  Oxford: 
      Blackwell. 
Hethy,  L.  1991.  Industrial  Relations  in  Eastern  Europe:  Recent  Developments  and  Trends.  London: 
      HarperCollins. 
Höpner,  M.  2003.  Wer    Beherrscht    die    Unternehmen?  Shareholder  Value,  Managerherrschaftt  und 
      Mitbestimmung in Deutschland. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. 
Huber, E. and Stephens, J. 2001. Development  and  Crisis  of  the  Welfare  State:  Parties  and  Policies  in 
      Global Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Huber, E. and Stephens, J. 1999. The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hyman, R. 1996. Institutional  Transfer:  Industrial  Relations  in  Eastern  Germany.  IRRU:  University  of 
      Warwick. 
Iankova,  E.  1997.  Social  Partnership  after  the  Cold  War:  The  Transformative  Corporatism  of   Post- 
      Communist Europe. New York: Cornell University Press. 
IDW 2001. Female Income. Informationsdienst der Deutschen Wirtschaft, 25:9. 
IG Metall 2000. Shop Stewards Discuss New Collective Bargaining Policies. Metall, 52:22. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
97 
Iversen, T. and  Soskice,  D.  2001.  An  Asset T heory  of  Social  Policy  Preferences.  American  Political 
      Science Review. 
Iversen, T. 1999. Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Macroeconomics and Wage  Bargaining. 
      Comparative Politics, 7:1. 
Jacoby, S. 1995. The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a  Global  Economy.  New  York:  Oxford 
      University Press. 
Katzenstein, P. 1989. Industry and Politics  in  West  Germany:  Toward  the  Third  Republic.  New  York: 
      Cornell University Press. 
Katzenstein, P. 1985. Small States  in  World  Markets:  Industrial  Policy  in  Europe.  New  York:  Cornell 
      University Press. 
Kern, H. and Schumann, M. 1985. Industriearbeit und Arbeitsbewubtsein. Frankfurt am Main:Suhrkamp. 
Kitschelt, H. 2001. The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Klikauer, T. 2002. Stability in Germany’s  Industrial  Relations:  A  Critique  on  Hassel’s  Erosion  Thesis.  
      British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40:2. 
Knut,  G.  and  Lloyd,  U.  2003.  An  Essay  on  Collective  Bargaining  and  Unemployment  in  Germany. 
      Berkeley: University of California.  
Knuth, M. 1997.  Active  Labour  Market  Policy  in  the  East:  The  Role  of  Employment   and   Training 
      Companies. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Knuth, M. 1993. Drehscheiben im Structurwandel. Berlin: Sigma. 
Kocher, R. 2002. Der Kanzler und Seine Basis. Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 1:7. 
Kocher, R. 1998. Lage hat die CDU neue Aufgaben. Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 2:10. 
Kohl,  J.  2002.  Meinungen  und  Einstellungen  der  Bürger  zur   Sozialen   Sicherung   Insbensodere   zur 
      Alterssicherung. Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 57:9. 
Kommission Mitbestimmung 1998. Mitbestimmung  und  neue  Unternehmenskulturen.  Gutersloh:  Verlag 
      Bertelsman Stiftung. 
Kotthoff, H.  1994.  Works  Councils  and  Citizen  Change  and  Continuity  of  Codetermination.  Munich: 
      Mehring Press. 
 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
98 
Kramer, C. Lange, P. Stevenson, L. 2000. Markets, States,  and  Risks:  The  Effects of  Social  Context  on 
      Economic Insecurity and Political Preferences. Washington: APSA. 
Kreibig,  V.  1992.  Realsozialistiche   Bertriebliche   Machstructuren   und   Industrielle   Beziehungen   im  
      Transformationsprozeb zur Marktwirtschaft. Chemnitz: WISOC. 
Kriesi, H. 1995. New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. London: UCL Press. 
Kuhlmann, R. 1998. Schicksalsjahre Eines Kontinents. Geneva: ILO. 
Kume, I. and Thelen, K. 2003. The  Future  of  Nationally  Embedded  Capitalism:  Industrial  Relations  in  
      Germany and Japan. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Larmann, W. and Niedenhoff, H. 2000. Codetermination at Plant Level. Wirtschaft im Unterricht, 26:10. 
Leszczenko, N. 2002. New Role for Civil Society: Theoretical and Methodological  Considerations  on  the 
      Impact of Civil Society over the Wider Public. Warsaw: Social Science Net Workshop. 
Levine, R. 1999. Law, Finance and Economic Growth. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 35:2.  
Liebert, U. and Merckel, W. 1991. Die Politik zur Deutschen Einheit. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 
Lubanski, N. 2000. Moving Closer Together – Trade  Union  Europeanization  in  the  Construction  Sector. 
      Transfer, 6:1. 
Manow, P. 2001. The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Martin, A. and Ross, G. 1999. The Brave New World of European Labour. Geneva: ILO. 
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. 1994. Economy, Organization and Management. Boston: Prentice Hall. 
McKersie, R. and Walton, R. 1991. A Behavioural Theory of Labour Relations. New York: ILR Press. 
Meyer, W. 1995.   Tarifverhandlungssystem,   Lohnhöhe    und    Beschäftigung.    Mitteilungen    aus    der 
      Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, 28:3. 
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. 1990. The Economics of  Modern  Manufacturing:  Technology,  Strategy,  and 
      Organization. American Economic Review, 80:3. 
Mocetti, S. 2004. Social Protection and Human Capital: Test of a Hypothesis. University of Bologna. 
Mocetti, S. 2002. Thesis in Economics. Università degli Studi di Siena. 
Mockrzycki, E. Rychard, A. and Zybertowics, A. 2002.  The  Lost  Dynamics:  On  the  not  Mature  Polish 
      Democracy. Warsaw: IFis PAN. 
Monopolkommission, 1998. Marktöffnung Umfassend Verwirklichen. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
99 
Morck,  R.  and  Nakamura,  M.  2000.  Japanese  Corporate  Governance  and  Macroeconomic   Problems. 
      Harvard: Institute of Economic Research.  
MPI, 2004. Germany: Immigration in Transition. 
Muller,  H.  2001.  Uber  die  Muhen  der   Profilbildung   Einer   Diesteleistungstgewerkshaft.   Industrielle 
      Beziehungen, 8:1. 
Muller-Jentsch, W. and Seitz, B. 1998. Bertriebsrate Gewinnen Konturen. Industrielle Beziehungen, 5:1. 
Muller-Jentsch,  W.  1995.  Auf  dem  Prüfstand:  Das  Deutsche  Modell  der   Industriellen   Beziehungen.  
      Industrielle Beziehungen, 2:1.  
Murakami, T. 2000. Trade Union Strategy and Teamwork: The British and  German  Car  Industry.  Labour 
      Studies Journal, 24:4. 
Nerdinger, F. and Spieb, E. 1998. Kooperation in Unternehmen. Mering: Rainer Hampp Verlag. 
Nullmeier,  F.   and   Rub,   F.   1993.   Die   Transformation   der   Sozialpolitik:   Vom    Sozialstaat    zum  
      Sicherungsstaat. Frankfurt: Campus. 
OECD, 1997. Employment Outlook. 
Offe, C. 2001. Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought. London: Routledge. 
Offe, C. 1991. Labour Parties in Postindustrial Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Okun, A. 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Washington:  Brookings Institution. 
Orren, K. and Skowronek, S. 1994. The Dynamics of American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Page, R. 2006. Co-Determination in Germany-A Beginner’s Guide. Düsseldorf: HBS. 
Pege, W. 1999. Trade Union Members in the Federal Parliament. IW Gewrkschaftsreport, 33:2. 
Pfeffer,  J.  and  Salancik  G.  1978.  The  External  Control  of  Organizations:   A   Resource   Dependence 
      Perspective. New York: Harper and Row. 
Pierson, P. 2001. The New Politics of Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pierson, P. 1996. The New Politics of Welfare State. World Politics, 48:2. 
Pierson, P. 1994. Dismantling the  Welfare  State?  Reagan,  Thatcher,  and  the  Politics  of  Retrenchment. 
      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pierson, P. and Weaver, K. 1993. Do Institutions Matter? Imposing Losses in Pension Policy.  Washington: 
      Brookings Institution. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
100 
Piore, M. and Sabel, C. 1984. The Second Industrial Divide. New York: Basic Books. 
Regini,  M.  2002.  Convergenza  e  Divergenza  Nella  Ri-Regolazione  dei  Mercati  del  Lavoro   e   Delle 
      Relazioni Industriali Europee. Milano: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. 
Rehder, B. 2001.  The  Impact   of   Plant-Level   Pacts   for   Employment   and   Competitiveness   on   the 
      Change of the German System of Industrial Relations. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. 
Reichard, S. 2002. Civil Society: Notes on the Revival of a Concept- and  its  use  for  Historical  Research. 
      Warsaw: IFis PAN. 
Rhodes,  M.  1997.  Globalization,   Labour   Markets   and   Welfare   States:   A   Future   of   Competitive 
      Corporatism? Florence: Robert Schuman Centre.  
Roller, E. 1999.  Shrinking  the  Welfare  State:  Citizens’  Attitudes  towards  Cuts  in  Social  Spending  in 
      Germany in the 1990s. German Politics, 8:1. 
Rothstein, B. 2002. Sweden: Social Capital in the Social Democratic State: The Swedish  Model  and  Civil 
      Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schafer, C. 2001. Die WSI Befragung von Bertriebs und Personalraten im Uberblick. Mitteilungen, 54:2.  
Schmidt, V. 2002. The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schmidt, V. 2000. Welfare  and  Work  in  the  Open  Economy:  From  Vulnerability  to  Competitiveness. 
      Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, K. Ashford, S. and Caroll, S. 1995. Intra and Interorganizational  Cooperation:  Toward  a  Research 
      Agenda. Academy of Management Journal, 38:1. 
Schmitter,  C.  and  Grote,  G.  1997.  Der  Korporatistische  Sisyphus:  Vergan  Genheit,   Gegenwart   und 
      Zukunft. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 38:3.   
Sorries, B. 1997. Die Entsenderichtlinie. Industrielle Bezeihungen, 4:2. 
Soskice, D. 2000. Corporate Governance in a Changing Economic and Political  Environment:  Trajectories 
      of Institutional Change on the European Continent. Berlin: WZB. 
Soskice,  D.  1994.  Germany  and  Japan:  Industry-co-ordinated  Market  Economy.  New  York:   Cornell 
      University Press. 
Soskice, D. 1990. Reinterpreting Corporatism and Explaining Unemployment: Co-Ordinated  and  Non-Co- 
      Ordinated Market Economies. Houndsmill, U.K.: Macmillan. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
101 
Steinmo, S. and Thelen, K. 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative  Analysis.  
      Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Streek, W. and Visser, J. 1998. An Evolutionary Dynamic of Trade Union Systems. Cologne: MPIfG. 
Streek, W. 1997. German Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive? New Political Economy, 2:1. 
Streek,  W.  1992.  Social  Institutions  and  Economic  Performance:  Studies  of   Industrial   Relations   in 
      Advanced Capitalist Economies. London: Sage Publications. 
Strengelhofen, T. and Wachter, H. 1995. Human Resource Management in Europe. Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Thelen, K. 2003. How  Institutions  Evolve:  Insights  from  Comparative-Historical  Analysis.  New  York: 
      Cambridge University Press. 
Thelen, K. 2000. Union, Employers, and  Central  Banks:  Macroeconomic  Coordination  and  Institutional 
      Change in Social Market Economies. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Thelen, K. 1993. West European Labour in Transition: Sweden and  Germany  Compared.  World  Politics, 
      46:10. 
Thelen, K. 1991. Union of  Parts:  Labour  Politics  in  Postwar  Germany.  New  York:  Cornell  University 
      Press. 
Traxler,  F.  1995.  From  Demand-Side  to  Supply-Side  Corporatism?  Organized  Industrial  Relations  in 
      Europe: What Future? Aldershot: Avebury. 
Tsebelis, G. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Turner, L. 1998. Fighting for Partnership: Labour and  Politics  in  Unified  Germany.  New  York:  Cornell 
      University Press. 
Vitols, S. 2003.  Negotiated  Shareholder  Value:  The  German  Version  of  an  Anglo-American  Practice.  
      Berlin: WZB. 
Vitols, S. 2002. Shareholder Value, Management Culture and Production Regimes in the Transformation of 
      the German Chemical-Pharmaceutical Industry. Competition and Change, 6:3.   
Vitols, S. Casper,  S.  Soskice,  D.  and  Woolcock,  S.  1997.  Corporate  Governance  System  in  UK  and 
      Germany. Berlin: WZB. 
Weaver,  K.  1998.  Automatic  Government:  The  Politics  of   Indexation.   Washington   DC:   Brookings 
      Institution. 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
102 
Weaver, K. 1998. Framing the Social Security Debate: Values, Politics  and  Economics.  Washington  DC: 
      Brookings Institution. 
Weaver, K. 1995. Negotiating Competitiveness: Employment Relations  and  Organizational  Innovation  in 
      Germany and the United States. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Weaver, K. 1986. The Politics of Blame Avoidance. Journal of Public Policy, 6:4. 
Webber, D. 1992. Kohl’s Wendepolitik After a Decade. German Politics, 1:8. 
Wildavsky, A. 1994. Why Self-Interest Means Less Outside of a Social Context: Cultural  Contributions  to 
      a Theory of Rational Choices. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6:2. 
Zachert, U. 1999. A Change of Paradigm in German Labour Law  –  An  Inspiration  for  Other  Countries? 
      International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 15:1. 
Zagelmeyer, S. 2000. Tarifverhandlungen in Euroland. IW-Gewerkschaftsreport, 34:2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
103 
    
  
 
    
    
       
       
  
 
  
  
 
          
  
 
  
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
The Challenge to Industrial Relations in Germany 
 
104 
       
 
       
        
 
 
      
 
 
       
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
